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I. INTRODUCTION
Current scholarly writings concerning the Employee Retirement
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA")' have noted recent problems arising in
the development of the proper statute of limitations period for an ER-
ISA action.2 While the Supreme Court could reduce the amount of
this ERISA litigation by declaring a simple uniform federal rule, it has
not done so, leaving the federal circuit courts to develop their own ER-
ISA jurisprudence. 3 These courts, no longer guided by such legal
greats as Byron "Whizzer" White,4 have fumbled the opportunity in
favor of a litigious multiplicity rule, thus spawning much of the ER-
ISA litigation. 5
The decisions of the federal circuit courts, at times, seem amazing
in their ability to evade the purposes of ERISA. For instance, Con-
gress intended ERISA to elevate the behavior of the plan officials by
imposing fiduciary duties.6 Pre-ERISA benefit law used contract the-
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29
U.S.C.).
2. See, e.g., Ronald Dean & Nancy Ross, Litigating ERISA Claims, in ERISA LITIGA-
TION, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS 307, 356-64 (2004) (containing
lengthy section on limitations cases).
3. See, e.g., Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739 (2004) (accepting
ERISA case only to resolve a difference of opinion among the federal circuit
courts); see also 28 U.S.C § 1254(1) (2000) (discretionary writ of certiorari for
cases in the federal circuit courts).
4. Besides serving as a Supreme Court Justice, Byron "Whizzer" White was one of
the greatest college football players at the University of Colorado as a half-back
and played for the Pittsburg Pirates (now Steelers) and Detroit Lions in the Na-
tional Football League. See Paul Tagliabue, A Tribute to Byron White, 112 YALE
L.J. 999, 999 (2003). For Justice White's handling of the limitations period issue
involved for a welfare plan, albeit for a pre-ERISA case, see infra notes 195-204
and accompanying text.
5. An in-law of the author, Judge Fidencio Garza, Federal Magistrate in Browns-
ville, Texas, once complained to the author and his recently wed spouse that forty
percent of his docket consisted of ERISA matters.
6. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
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ories, 7 which ordinarily provide for a low standard of behavior to de-
termine employee benefits.8 On this body of existing law, the ERISA
statute imposed the higher altruistic standard of fiduciary behavior on
the parties to the employee benefit program, namely the sponsor, the
trustees, and the plan administrator.9 The federal circuit courts, how-
ever, initially tried to blunt this innovation'O by reviewing the plan
fiduciary decisions under the arbitrary and capricious rule. This rule
was highly favorable to plan fiduciaries," as opposed to the standard
fiduciary behavior required by ERISA.12 ERISA recognized the em-
ployer's promise of benefits, supported by the consideration of the em-
ployee's deferred compensation, as a contractual relationship.13 Yet,
the circuit courts determined that an ERISA lawsuit involved a mat-
ter of trust, and consequently denied jury trials.14
7. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112-13 (1989) (benefit
denial situation).
8. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 829-32 (1983) (explain-
ing that contract law does not go beyond morals of the marketplace, while fiduci-
ary law is altruistic).
9. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 404, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a) (2000); H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 11 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649 (ERISA "codifies and makes applicable to [ERISA] fidu-
ciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts"); S. REP.
No. 93-127, at 29 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4865.
10. See S. REP. No. 93-127, at 36, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.A.N. 4838, 4872 ("[Tlhe
Committee has concluded that safeguards are required to preclude this type of
abuse [employer retaliatory discrimination] from being carried out and in order
to completely secure the rights and expectations brought into being by this
landmark reform legislation.") (emphasis added).
11. See, e.g., STEPHEN R. BRUCE, PENSION CLAIMS: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 309-13
(1993) (commenting on the inappropriateness of the arbitrary and capricious
rule); George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: The Arbitrary and Capricious Rule Under
Siege, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 133, 139-43 (1990) (providing early circuit court opin-
ions on the deference to the plan administrator's decision). This rule now sur-
vives as part of the abuse of discretion rule. Compare Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115
(adopting the abuse of discretion rule), with Flint, supra, at 168-72 (explaining
the arbitrary and capricious rule as part of the abuse of discretion rule); see also
Jordan v. Northrup Grumman Corp. Welfare Benefit Plan, 370 F.3d 869, 875-76
(9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that the review rule for the ERISA benefits due deci-
sion remains the abuse of discretion rule).
12. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 404(a).
13. See, e.g., George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Reformulating the Federal Common Law
for Plan Interpretation, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 955, 986-88 (1995) (providing the
legislative history from both Houses of Congress recognizing the contractual de-
ferred compensation theory in ERISA); see also Phillips v. Ala. Hotel Employees
Pension Fund, 944 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1991) (recognizing the adoption by Con-
gress of the deferred compensation theory for the pension promise); Demisay v.
Local 144 Nursing Home Pension Fund, 935 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1991); Knauss v.
Gorman, 583 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1978).
14. See, e.g., George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Jury Trial Mandated for Benefit Claims
Actions, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 361, 383-93 (1992) (reviewing federal decisions on
the issue ofjury trial); see also Muller v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 341 F.3d 119,
2005]
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ERISA also contains a broad preemption provision obliterating
state law as it relates to employee benefit matters.1 5 Nevertheless,
the circuit courts used state law to determine whether the federal
spendthrift provision16 protected pension benefits under bankruptcy
law,17 until that practice was corrected by the Supreme Court.18
The federal circuit courts have created a similar situation for the
statute of limitations for employee benefit plan lawsuits. ERISA con-
tains a statute of limitations for lawsuits concerning a breach of fidu-
ciary duty.19 However, ERISA limits the applicability of that statute
of limitations to the fiduciary duty provisions contained in sections
401 to 414.20 Participant-beneficiary lawsuits to enforce these provi-
sions normally arise under sections 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(3), provid-
ing legal and equitable remedies for ERISA violations. 2 1 But ERISA
also provides a separate cause of action for plan recoveries of damages
arising from fiduciary duty breaches. 2 2 Therefore, the circuit courts
generally have refused to apply the ERISA statute of limitations to
any ERISA action that arises under a provision other than the fiduci-
ary duty section for plan recoveries. 23 These other ERISA causes of
124 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that an ERISA benefits due lawsuit remains a
bench trial before the judge, without a jury); Thomas v. Or. Fruit Prods. Co., 228
F.3d 991, 995-96 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that an ERISA employer retaliatory
discrimination lawsuit entails no right to a jury trial).
15. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 514(a). For the application of
ERISA's preemption provision to the limitations issue, see infra notes 160-84
and accompanying text.
16. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 206(d)(1).
17. See, e.g., George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Anti-Alienation Superiority in Bank-
ruptcy, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 411, 463-79 (1991-1992) (reviewing federal decisions
on the issue of the ERISA spend-thrift trust).
18. See Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 759-60 (1992).
19. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 413. For the application of ER-
ISA's statute of limitations to the limitations issue, see infra notes 240-74 and
accompanying text. ERISA also contains other statutes of limitations for various
actions by the PBGC. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act
§§ 4003(e)(6), (f)(5), 4068(d)(2), 4070(f), 4301(f) and the multiemployer plan
amendments to ERISA.
20. Employee Retirement Income Security Act §§ 401-414.
21. See infra notes 68, 264-68 and accompanying text.
22. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act §§ 409, 502(a)(2). For the applica-
tion of ERISA's plan recovery provision, see infra note 33 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. The Third and Ninth Circuits
early did apply the ERISA statute of limitations to both a benefits due lawsuit,
see Meagher v. Int'l Assoc. of Machinists Pension Plan, 856 F.2d 1418, 1422-23
(9th Cir. 1988); Edwards v. Wilkes-Barre Publ'g Co. Pension Trust, 757 F.2d 52,
55 (3d Cir. 1985), and to a delinquent employer contribution lawsuit, see Adams
v. Gould Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 867 (3d Cir. 1984), but since have recanted. For the
benefits due lawsuit, see infra notes 54-56, 63-64 and accompanying text. For
the delinquent employer contribution lawsuit, see infra and note 110 and accom-
panying text.
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action are most notably the informational penalty lawsuit,24 the bene-
fits due lawsuit,25 the equitable remedy lawsuit to enforce various
plan provisions,26 the employer retaliatory discrimination lawsuit,27
and the employer delinquent contribution lawsuit.2s In these five sit-
uations, the circuit courts have opted to use other law to determine
the limitations period.29 Surprisingly, the circuit courts, rather than
developing a uniform federal common law rule applicable to all per-
sons similarly situated, have instead chosen to use the very same
state law that ERISA supposedly preempted.3 0 Even more shocking is
that the state law generally chosen is the same contract law rejected
for determining whether the court should conduct the ERISA lawsuit
by jury trial.31
This article aims to show that this approach utilized by the circuit
courts is incorrect. Part II performs a cursory investigation of the cir-
cuit courts' decisions narrowed in scope to their limitations period for
the informational penalty lawsuit, the benefits due lawsuit, the equi-
24. Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 502(a)(1)(A).
25. Id. § 502(a)(1)(B). Circuit courts have refused to apply the ERISA statute of limi-
tation to the benefits due lawsuit. See Wetzel v. Lou Ehlers Cadillac Group Long
Term Disability Ins. Program, 222 F.3d 643 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that it only
applies to breaches of fiduciary duty, not claims against plan for benefits);
Nikaido v. Centennial Life Ins. Co., 42 F.3d 557, 559 n.1 (9th Cir. 1994); Flana-
gan v. Inland Empire Elec. Workers Pension Plan & Trust, 3 F.3d 1246, 1252 (9th
Cir. 1993); Kennedy v. Electricians Pension Plan, IBEW No. 995, 954 F.2d 1116,
1120 (5th Cir. 1992); Johnson v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 942 F.2d 1260
(8th Cir. 1991) (stating that it only applies to enforcement of fiduciary duties);
Wright v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 925 F.2d 1288, 1290 (10th Cir. 1991) (stat-
ing that it only applies to violations of the fiduciary sections).
26. Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 502(a)(3). Circuit courts have re-
fused to apply the ERISA statue of limitations to an equitable remedy lawsuit to
enforce plan provisions. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v. Sanders, 138
F.3d 1347, 1356 n.8 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating the ERISA statute of limitations is
irrelevant to an ERISA action for restitution from beneficiaries under plan subro-
gation provision).
27. Employee Retirement Income Security Act §§ 502(a)(3), 510. Circuit courts have
refused to apply the ERISA statute of limitations to the employer retaliatory dis-
crimination lawsuit. See Held v. Mfrs. Hanover Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197,
1200-02 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that it only applies to violations of the fiduciary
sections).
28. Employee Retirement Income Security Act §§ 502(a)(3), 515. Circuit courts have
refused to apply the ERISA statute of limitations to the employer delinquent con-
tribution lawsuit. See Felton v. Unisource Corp., 940 F.2d 503, 510-11 (9th Cir.
1991) (stating it does not apply to a delinquent employer contribution case); Trs.
of the Wyo. Laborers Health & Welfare Plan v. Morgen & Osgood Constr. Co., 850
F.2d 613, 618 n.8 (10th Cir. 1988) (stating that it only applies to actions to re-
dress a fiduciary's breach).
29. For decisions creating a multiplicity of statutes of limitations for other ERISA
actions, see infra notes 35-110 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 169-84 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
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table remedy lawsuit to enforce plan provisions, the employer retalia-
tory discrimination lawsuit, and the delinquent employer contribution
lawsuit. Then, Part III outlines the anomaly of using state statutes of
limitations for ERISA lawsuits. Finally, Part IV demonstrates the
reasoning that the circuit courts should have used to determine a uni-
form federal common law for the limitations period for all ERISA
causes of action.
II. CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS
When confronted with a statute of limitations defense in an ERISA
lawsuit, a circuit court will first determine whether the cause of action
involves a plan recovery of damages arising from a breach of fiduciary
duty, for which the ERISA statute of limitations applies. That statute
of limitations bars breach of fiduciary duty claims after the earlier of
six years from the breach or three years from the date the plaintiff
acquires actual knowledge of the breach.32 Currently, the circuit
courts only recognize two ERISA causes of action involving a breach of
fiduciary duty to which the ERISA statute of limitations applies: (1)
the action for plan recovery of damages from breaches of fiduciary
duty3 3 and (2) equitable relief for violation of the ERISA fiduciary pro-
visions. 34 If the ERISA action does not involve one of these two
32. For the ERISA statute of limitations, see infra note 245 and accompanying text.
The major ERISA fiduciary duties are the exclusive benefit duty, prudent person
duty, diversification duty, and the duty to follow the plan documents. See Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act § 404(a)(1)(A)-(D). ERISA also applies a
co-fiduciary liability and liability for engaging in prohibited transactions. See id.
§§ 405, 406.
33. Employee Retirement Income Security Act §§ 409, 502(a)(2). See Wright v.
Heyne, 349 F.3d 321 (6th Cir. 2003) (receipt of commission constituted a prohib-
ited transaction; brought by trustee); Brown v. Am. Life Holdings, Inc., 190 F.3d
856 (8th Cir. 1999) (improper investments violates diversification rule; brought
by participant); Larson v. Northrop Corp., 21 F.3d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (failure
to comply with plan provisions; brought by participant); Rogers v. Millan, 902
F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1990) (failure to oversee co-fiduciary; brought by participant);
Schaefer v. Ark. Med. Soc'y, 853 F.2d 1487 (8th Cir. 1988) (failure to disclose
violates exclusive benefit duty; brought by trustee); Brock v. Nellis, 809 F.2d 753
(11th Cir. 1987) (advise to trustee to buy grossly above FMV violates prudent
person rule; brought by Department of Labor).
34. Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 502(a)(3). The circuit courts did not
recognize this action until its confirmation by the Supreme Court in 1996. See
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996). This ERISA cause of action also pro-
vides for equitable remedies in two other situations: (1) violation of plan provi-
sions; and (2) violation of ERISA provisions other than the fiduciary duty
sections. See Million v. Trs. of the Cent. States, Southeast & Southwest Areas
Pension Fund, 50 Fed. Appx. 196, 199 (6th Cir. 2002) (making amendments);
Spangler v. Altec Int'l Ltd. P'ship, 172 F.3d 53 (7th Cir. 1999) (intentional mis-
representations); Radford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 151 F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 1998)
(negligent misrepresentations).
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claims, the circuit court deems itself free to fashion a limitations pe-
riod on its own.
A. The Rule of State Statute of Limitations
For ERISA causes of action other than plan recovery of damages
arising from a breach of fiduciary duty, the circuit courts have settled
on a rule of using the most analogous state statute of limitations. This
practice has spawned much litigation, especially for the benefits due
lawsuit, the employer retaliatory discrimination lawsuit, and the de-
linquent employer contribution lawsuit. Use of state law first requires
the circuit court to determine which state's law applies. Then, for
each state, the circuit courts need to resolve the issue of the most anal-
ogous state statute of limitations. Since states have a multiplicity of
statutes of limitations, the circuit courts have a wide selection. As a
result, the most analogous statute of limitations varies from state to
state in subject matter, even for the same ERISA cause of action, and
in length, even for the same type of state statute.
Besides the cost of litigating the choice of law and most analogous
state cause of action issues, the problem worsens for interstate plans.
Similarly situated employees in different states will have different
rights with respect to bringing a lawsuit depending on which state's
law applies.3 5 Other litigants will have the opportunity to forum shop
to locate a state that will not foreclose their lawsuit, or that will sup-
ply them with the limitations defense.3 6
1. The Informational Penalty Lawsuit
For the informational penalty lawsuit,37 the circuit courts have yet
to settle on a single type of most analogous state statute of limitations.
The circuit courts have used the Texas two-year limitations period for
a fiduciary duty breach38 and the California three-year limitations pe-
35. See infra notes 298-305 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 298-305 and accompanying text.
37. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 502(a)(1)(A), (c)(1). ERISA sec-
tion 502(a)(1)(A) provides "[a] civil action may be brought (1) by a participant or
beneficiary (A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section." Id.
§ 502(a)(1)(A). Section 502(c)(1) provides:
Any administrator. . . (B) who fails or refuses to comply with a request
for any information which such administrator is required by this title to
furnish to a participant or beneficiary ... by mailing the material re-
quested to the last known address of the requesting participant or bene-
ficiary within 30 days after such request may in the court's discretion be
personally liable to such participant or beneficiary in the amount of up to
$100 a day from the date of such failure or refusal ....
Id. § 502(c)(1).
38. See Hatteberg v. Red Adair Co., Inc. Employees' Profit Sharing Plan, 79 Fed.
Appx. 709 (5th Cir. 2003).
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riod for statutory liability other than a penalty or forfeiture. 39 For
Utah, the Tenth Circuit did not decide whether to apply the three-year
limitations period for insurance contracts or the four-year catch-all
limitations period.4 0
2. The Benefits Due Lawsuit
For the benefits due lawsuit,41 most circuit courts have settled on
the statute of limitations for written contracts as the most analogous
statute of limitations. This rule does not provide any sort of uniform
ERISA rule. Not only do many states have statutes of limitations with
widely different periods, some states have multiple statutes of limita-
tions, each corresponding to a different type of contract.
For example, the Second Circuit, applying New York law, used a
six-year limitations period.42 The Fourth Circuit used a three-year
limitations period in applying Maryland law, 43 while using a one-year
limitations period for insurance contracts under Virginia law. 44 The
Fifth Circuit used a four-year limitations period under Texas law.45
The Sixth Circuit applied a fifteen-year limitations period under Ohio
law.4 6 The Seventh Circuit used a ten-year limitations period under
Illinois law. 4 7 The Eighth Circuit used a ten-year limitations period
39. See Stone v. Travelers Corp., 58 F.3d 434 (9th Cir. 1995); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 338(a) (West 1991 & Supp. 2005).
40. See Moore v. Berg Enter., Inc., 201 F.3d 448 (10th Cir. 1999); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 31A-21-313(1) (insurance), 78-12-25(3) (2003) (catch-all).
41. ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) provides "[a] civil action may be brought (1) by a par-
ticipant or beneficiary ... (B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of
his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights
to future benefits under the terms of the plan." Employee Retirement Income
Security Act § 502(a)(1)(B).
42. See Larson v. NMU Pension Trust of NMU Pension, 902 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1990);
Lamontagne v. Pension Plan of the United Wire, Metal & Mach. Pension Fund,
869 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1989); Miles v. N.Y. State Teamsters Pension & Ret. Fund
Employee Benefit Plan, 698 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1983); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213 (McKin-
ney 2003).
43. See Martone v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 983 F.2d 1056 (4th Cir. 1992); Cotter v.
E. Conference of Teamsters Ret. Plan, 898 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1990); Rodriguez v.
MEBA Pension Trust, 872 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1989); Dameron v. Sinai Hosp. of
Baltimore, Inc., 815 F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1987); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 5-101 (2002).
44. See Payne v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., 976 F.2d 727 (4th Cir. 1992) (un-
published table decision); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-314 (2002).
45. See Hogan v. Kraft Foods, 969 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1992); TEx. Crv. PRAc. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 16.004 (Vernon 2002).
46. See Meade v. Pension Appeals & Review Comm., 966 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1992);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.06 (Anderson 2001).
47. See Daill v. Sheet Metal Workers' Local 73 Pension Fund, 100 F.3d 62 (7th Cir.
1996); Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 933 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1991); Jenkins
v. Local 705 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Pension Plan, 713 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1983);
735 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-206 (West 2003).
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under Iowa48 and Missouri law for written contracts49 (overruling
prior cases approving a five-year limitations period for unwritten con-
tracts),50 an eight-year limitations period under South Dakota law,51
and a five-year limitations period under Arkansas52 and Nebraska
law.53 The Ninth Circuit used a six-year limitations period under Ari-
zona 54 and Washington law,55 and a four-year limitations period
under California law56 (overruling the prior approval of the three-year
limitations period applicable to insurance contracts). 57 The Tenth
Circuit applied a six-year limitations period under Utah58 and Colo-
rado law,59 and five-year limitations period under Oklahoma law. 60
48. See Shaw v. McFarland Clinic, P.C., 363 F.3d 744 (8th Cir. 2004); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 614.1(5) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004).
49. See Harris v. Epoch Group, L.C., 357 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 2004); Johnson v. State
Mut. Life Assurance Co. of Am., 942 F.2d 1260 (8th Cir. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 516.110(1) (West 2002); see also Todd M. Worscheck, Eighth Circuit Struggles
to Select Appropriate State of Limitations for ERISA Claims: Difficulties with a
Straight Forward Matter: Johnson v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co. of
America, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 861 (1992).
50. See Mason v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 662 (8th Cir. 1990); Fogerty v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 850 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1988), overruled by Johnson, 942 F.2d at
1266; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.120(1) (West 2002).
51. See Anderson v. John Mortell & Co., 830 F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED
LAW § 15-2-13 (Michie 2004).
52. See Bennett v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 837 (8th Cir. 1998); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-56-111 (Michie Supp. 2003).
53. See Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Beckham, 138 F.3d 325 (8th Cir. 1998); Schroeder v.
Philips Petroleum Co., 970 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-205(1)
(Reissue 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
54. See McElwaine v. US West, Inc., 176 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 1999); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-548 (West 2003).
55. See Flanagan v. Inland Empire Elec. Workers Pension Plan & Trust, 3 F.3d 1246
(9th Cir. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.040 (West Supp. 2004-2005).
56. See Mogck v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 292 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2002); Giles v.
Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 242 F.3d 381 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table
decision); Wetzel v. Lou Ehlers Cadillac Group Long Term Disability Ins. Pro-
gram, 189 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 1999); Pisciotta v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 92 F.3d
1326 (9th Cir. 1996); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 337 (West 1982).
57. See Sommer v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 173 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 1999) (three-year stat-
ute of limitation); Williams v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 113 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 1997)
(three-year statute of limitation), overruled by Wetzel v. Lou Ehlers Cadillac
Group Long Term Disability Ins. Program, 222 F.3d 643 (9th Cir. 2000); Nikaido
v. Centennial Life Ins. Co., 42 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 1994) (three-year statute of limi-
tation), overruled by Wetzel v. Lou Ehlers Cadillac Group Long Term Disability
Ins. Program, 222 F.3d 643 (9th Cir. 2000); CAL. INS. CODE § 103.50.11 (West
1982).
58. See Lang v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d 1102 (10th Cir. 1999); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 31A-21-313(1) (2003).
59. See Lee v. Rocky Mountain UFCW Unions & Employers Trust Pension Plan, 13
F.3d 405 (10th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-80-103.5 (West 2004).
60. See Wright v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 925 F.2d 1288 (10th Cir. 1991); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 12, § 95 (Supp. 2005).
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The Eleventh Circuit used a six-year limitations period under Geor-
gia61 and Alabama law.62
In contrast, these and other circuits, under different circum-
stances, have determined that the most analogous state statute of lim-
itations for the benefits due lawsuit is not one based on written
contract. For example, the Third Circuit sees the benefits due action
as one for wages, as does the Sixth Circuit for Minnesota. However,
the Sixth Circuit views the benefits due action as one for short-term
disability in Iowa. This choice provides a one-year limitations period
for Delaware 6 3 and a three-year limitations period for Pennsylvania. 64
For Minnesota's 6 5 and Iowa's short-term disability,66 a two-year limi-
tations period applies. For the nation's one civil jurisdiction, Louisi-
ana, the Fifth Circuit has determined the benefits due lawsuit is not
one for wages, but a personal action for which the limitations period is
ten-years. 6 7
3. The Equitable Remedy Lawsuit to Enforce Plan Provisions
Only one type of equitable remedy lawsuit to enforce plan provi-
sions under ERISA has dealt with the limitations period. 68 That type
was the subsequently partially disallowed enforcement of plan reim-
bursement contracts for wrongfully paid benefits as authorized by the
61. See Harrison v. Digital Health Plan, 183 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 1999); GA. CODE
ANN. § 9-3-28 (Supp. 2004).
62. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v. Sanders, 138 F.3d 1347 (lth Cir. 1998);
ALA. CODE § 6-2-34(9) (1993).
63. See Stafford v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours, 27 Fed. Appx. 137 (3d Cir. 2002); Syed v.
Hercules Inc., 214 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8111 (1999).
64. See Connors v. Consolidation Coal Co., 866 F.2d 599 (3d Cir. 1989); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43 §§ 260.2a (defining wages to include ERISA plan moneys), 260.9a(g)
(West 1992). But see Heinglein v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 260 F.3d 201 (3d
Cir. 2001) (binding parties who neglected to appeal companion lawsuit to a six-
year statute of limitations).
65. See Adamson v. Armco, Inc., 44 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 541.07(5) (West 2002).
66. See Meade v. Intermec Techs. Corp., 271 F.3d 715 (8th Cir. 2001); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 614.1(8) (West 1999).
67. See Hall v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 105 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 1997); Kennedy v. Electri-
cians Pension Plan, IBEW No. 995, 954 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1992); LA. Civ. CODE
ANN. art. 3499 (West 1994).
68. ERISA section 502(a)(3) provides:
A civil action may be brought . . . (3) by a participant, beneficiary, or
fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of
this title or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equi-
table relief (i) to redress such violations such violations or (ii) to enforce
any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(3) (2000).
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plan.6 9 Prior to the Supreme Court's partial disallowance of plan re-
imbursements for wrongfully paid benefits, the circuit courts used the
Massachusetts six-year limitations period for contracts, 7 0 the Wash-
ington six-year limitations period for written contracts, 7 1 and the Ala-
bama six-year limitations period for contracts. 7 2 For Arkansas, the
Eighth Circuit did not decide whether to apply the three-year limita-
tions period for unwritten contracts or the five-year limitations period
for written contracts.7 3
4. The Employer Retaliatory Discrimination Lawsuit
For the employer retaliatory discrimination lawsuit,74 most circuit
courts have settled on the statute of limitations for wrongful termina-
tion as the most analogous statute of limitations. Again, this rule does
not provide any sort of uniform ERISA application. Retaliatory dis-
crimination could fit under several different state lawsuits. Conse-
quently, some circuit courts have selected multiple standards, even for
69. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210-11 (2002)
(disallowing under ERISA section 502(a)(3)(B) the equitable relief of enforcement
of plan reimbursement provisions when beneficiary is not in possession of funds
since founded on contractual obligation to pay). The circuit courts have extended
this rule to the situation where the beneficiary has possession of the funds. See,
e.g., Qualchoice, Inc. v. Rowland, 367 F.3d 638, 642-49 (6th Cir. 2004) (following
Knudson for beneficiary possession of the funds after discussion of similar post-
Knudson law).
70. See Wang Labs., Inc. v. Kagan, 990 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1993) (under California
choice of law rules); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 260, § 2 (West 2004).
71. See Pierce County Hotel Employees Health Trust v. Elks Lodge, B.P.O.E. No.
1450, 827 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1987); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.16.040 (West
1988 & Supp. 2005).
72. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v. Sanders, 138 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1998);
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v. Weitz, 913 F.2d 1544 (11th Cir. 1990); ALA.
CODE § 6-2-34(9) (1993).
73. See Admin. Comm. of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Soles ex rel. Estate of Hollander,
336 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 2003); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-56-105 (unwritten), 16-56-
111 (written) (Michie 1987 & Supp. 2003).
74. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 502(a)(3)(B), 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (2000). ERISA section 510 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel,
discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exer-
cising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an em-
ployee benefit plan, [or] this subchapter . . . or for the purpose of
interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant
may become entitled under the plan, [or] this subchapter ....
Id. § 510; see also Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 368 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir.
2004) (stating an employer retaliatory discrimination lawsuit is brought under
ERISA section 502(a)(3)(B)). See generally BRUCE, supra note 11, at 533-34. The
employer retaliatory discrimination action frequently arises in the context of a
termination to avoid providing benefits. See, e.g., Anderson v. Consol. Rail Corp.,
297 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 2002).
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a single state, while other circuit courts disagree even for the same
state.
For the Fifth Circuit, this wrongful termination rule provides a
two-year limitations period in Texas.7 5 For the Sixth Circuit, this rule
provides a four-year limitations period in Ohio.76 For the Ninth Cir-
cuit, this rule provides a two-year limitations period in Arizona.7 7 For
the Tenth Circuit, this rule provides a two-year limitations period for
employment claims in Oklahoma78 and a two-year limitations period
for wrongful termination in Kansas. 7 9
Both the Second and Third Circuits have oscillated as to the most
analogous state statute of limitations. New York has either a six-year
limitations period for a written contract 8 O or a two-year limitations
period for wrongful termination.81 (The Tenth Circuit, under the Col-
orado choice of law rule, decided on a three-year limitations period for
employment discrimination in New York.)82 Pennsylvania has either
a six-year limitations period for residual claims8 3 or a two-year limita-
tions for wrongful termination.8 4 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit is un-
able to decide for Illinois between a five-year limitations period for
retaliatory discharge or a ten-year limitations period for written con-
tracts.8 5 The Ninth Circuit cannot decide for California-it is either a
three-year limitations period for statutory claims,86 a two-year limita-
75. See Berry v. Allstate Ins. Co., 84 Fed. Appx. 442 (5th Cir. 2004); McClure v.
Zoecon, Inc., 936 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1991); TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 16,003 (Vernon 2002).
76. See Taylor v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 38 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 1994) (unpub-
lished table decision); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.09(D) (Anderson 2001).
77. See Felton v. Unisource Corp., 940 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1991); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-542 (West 2003).
78. See Woods v. Halliburton Co., 49 Fed. Appx. 827 (10th Cir. 2002); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 95(3) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005).
79. See Myers v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 26 Fed. Appx. 855 (10th Cir. 2002); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-513(a)(4) (1994 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
80. See Botsas v. United States, 5 Fed. Appx. 69 (2d Cir. 2001); Sadowski v. Technical
Career Insts., Inc., 107 F.3d 4 (2d Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 213(2) (McKinney 2003).
81. See Sandberg v. KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP, 111 F.3d 331 (2d Cir. 1997); N.Y.
WORKERS' COMP. LAW § 120 (McKinney 1994).
82. See Held v. Mfrs. Hanover Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1990); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 214 (McKinney 2003).
83. See Monkelis v. Mobay Chem., 827 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1987); Gavalik v. Cont'l Can
Co., 812 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1987); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5527 (West 2004).
84. See Anderson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 2002); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5524(7) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005).
85. See Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 977 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1992); 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/13-205 (discharge), 13-206 (contract) (West 2003).
86. See D'Andrea v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., 951 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpub-
lished table decision); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338 (West 1982 & Supp. 2005).
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tions period for an oral contract,8 7 or a one-year limitations period for
wrongful termination,8 8 but not a four-year limitations period for
written contracts.8 9 The Eleventh Circuit uses a different sort of anal-
ogous statute for each state. For Alabama, it is a two-year limitations
period for retaliatory discharge, 90 for Florida, it is a four-year limita-
tions period for a statutory claim,91 and for Georgia, it is a two-year
limitations period for wages. 92
The Sixth and Eighth Circuits disagree for Tennessee. The Sixth
Circuit decided on a one-year limitations period for wrongful dis-
charge in Tennessee,93 while the Eighth Circuit, using Missouri's
choice of law rule, has settled on a six-year limitations period for writ-
ten contracts in Tennessee.94
In contrast, the First Circuit applies a ten-year limitations period
for a tort in Massachusetts. 95 The Third Circuit has decided the limi-
tations period is one-year for wages in Delaware. 9 6
5. The Delinquent Employer Contribution Lawsuit
For the delinquent employer contribution lawsuit,9 7 most circuit
courts have settled on the statute of limitations for written contracts
as the most analogous statute of limitations. The delinquent employer
87. See Benson v. Hafif, 114 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1997); Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d
391 (9th Cir. 1993); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 339 (West 1982 & Supp. 2005).
88. See Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass'n v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry Co., 210
F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision); Burrey v. Pac. Gas & Elec.
Co., 159 F.3d 388 (9th Cir. 1998); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340(3) (West 1982 &
Supp. 2005).
89. See Kim v. Pac. Bell, 9 Fed. Appx. 768 (9th Cir. 2001); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE
§ 337 (West 1982 & Supp. 2005).
90. See Musick v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.3d 136 (11th Cir. 1996); ALA.
CODE § 6-2-38 (1993).
91. See Byrd v. MacPapers, Inc., 961 F.2d 157 (11th Cir. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 95.11(3)(f) (West 2002).
92. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 865 F.2d 1237 (11th Cir. 1989); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-3-22 (1982).
93. See Leemis v. Med. Servs. Research Group, Inc., 75 Fed. Appx. 986 (6th Cir.
2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-307 (1999).
94. See Heideman v. PFL, Inc., 904 F.2d 1262 (8th Cir. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-
3-109 (2000).
95. See Muldoon v. C.J. Muldoon & Sons, 278 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2002); MASs. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 260, § 2A (West 2004).
96. See Syed v. Hercules Inc., 214 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 8111 (1999).
97. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 502(a)(3)(B), 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (2000). ERISA section 515 states:
Every employer who is obligated to make contributions to a multiem-
ployer plan under the terms of the plan or under the terms of a collec-
tively bargained agreement shall, to the extent not inconsistent with
law, make such contributions in accordance with the terms and condi-
tions of such plan or such agreement.
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contribution lawsuit arises in multiemployer plans for which the em-
ployer obligates itself to make contributions in a collective bargaining
agreement. 9 8 This rule merely perpetuates the chaos present for the
benefits due lawsuit since states have a myriad of possible statutes,
many not uniform with any other state.
The Second Circuit chose to provide a six-year limitations period in
New York.99 For the Sixth Circuit, this rule yields a six-year limita-
tions period for both Michigan100 and Tennessee.101 For the Seventh
Circuit, this rule yields a ten-year limitations period for Illinois.102
For the Eighth Circuit, this rule yields a ten-year limitations period
for Iowa. l0 3 For the Ninth Circuit, this rule yields a six-year limita-
tions period for Alaska,o4 Washington,' 0 5 and Hawaii,' 0 6 and a four-
year limitations period for California.1o 7 For the Tenth Circuit, this
rule yields a ten-year limitations period for Wyoming.1OS For the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, this rule yields a two-year limitations pe-
Id. § 515; see also Trs. of Wyo. Laborers Health & Welfare Plan v. Morgen &
Oswood Constr. Co., Inc., 850 F.2d 613 (10th Cir. 1988) (stating an employer de-
linquent contribution lawsuit is brought under ERISA section 502(a)(3)(B)).
98. See, e.g., Mich. United Food & Commercial Workers Unions v. Muir Co., 992 F.2d
594 (6th Cir. 1993).
99. See O'Hare v. Gen. Marine Transp. Corp., 740 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1984); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 213 (McKinney 2003).
100. See Muir, 992 F.2d at 597; Trs. for Mich. Carpenters' Council Health & Welfare
Fund v. Sobie Co., 885 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1989) (unpublished table decision); La-
borers' Pension Trust Fund v. Sidney Weinberger Homes, Inc., 872 F.2d 702 (6th
Cir. 1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5807(8) (West 2000).
101. See Cent. States Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Kraftco, Inc., 799
F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-109(a)(3) (2000).
102. See Teamsters Welfare Trust v. Gorman Bros. Ready Mix, 283 F.3d 877 (7th Cir.
2002); Cent. States Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Jordan, 873
F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1989); Trs. of the Operative Plasterers' Local Union Officers &
Employees Pension Fund v. Journeyman Plasterers' Protective & Benevolent
Soc'y, Local Union No. 5, 794 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1986); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/13-206 (West 2003).
103. See Robbins v. Iowa Rd. Builders Co., 828 F.2d 1348 (8th Cir. 1987); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 614.1(5) (West 1999).
104. See Trs. for Alaska Laborers-Constr. Indus. Health & Sec. Fund v. Ferrell, 812
F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1987); ALAsKA STAT. § 9.10.050 (Michie 2002).
105. See Pierce County Hotel Employees Health Trust v. Elks Lodge, B.P.O.E. No.
1450, 827 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.040 (West
1988 & Supp. 2005).
106. See Haw. Carpenters Trust Funds v. Waiola Carpenter Shop, Inc., 823 F.2d 289
(9th Cir. 1987); HAw. REV. STAT. § 657-1(1) (1993).
107. See Northwest Adm'rs, Inc. v. Truck-A-Way, 992 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1993); N.
Cal. Retail Clerks Unions & Food Employers Joint Pension Trust Fund v. Jumbo
Mkts., Inc., 906 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1990); CAL. CIrv. PROC. CODE § 337 (West
1982).
108. See Trs. of Wyo. Laborers Health & Welfare Plan v. Morgen & Oswood Const. Co.,
850 F.2d 613 (10th Cir. 1988); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-3-105(a)(i) (Michie 2003).
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riod.'0 9 But the Third Circuit for Pennsylvania uses the same three-
year limitations period for wage collection it uses for the benefits due
lawsuit.'1 0
B. Avoiding State Statutes of Limitations Contractually
A few welfare plans have escaped the hodge-podge of using state
statutes of limitations for the benefits due lawsuit. Some states' in-
surance laws require insurance policies for health and disability to
contain a limitations provision."' ERISA pre-emption of state law
contains an exception for insurance law. 11 2 Under this exception,
states can mandate ERISA insurance contract provisions. 1 13 Conse-
quently, many health and disability plans contain a contractual limi-
tations provision. The circuit courts uphold these contractual
limitations provided they are reasonable. 114
109. See Connors v. Hallmark & Son Coal Co., 935 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1991); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 12-310(7) (2005).
110. See Sheet Metal Workers, Local 19 v. 2300 Group, Inc., 949 F.2d 1274 (3d Cir.
1991); Vernau v. Vic's Mkt., Inc., 896 F.2d 43 (3d Cir. 1990); Teamsters Pension
Trust Funds v. John Tinney Delivery Serv., Inc., 732 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1984);
Byrnes v. DeBolt Transfer, Inc., 741 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1984); 43 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 260.9a(g) (West 1992). For the benefits due lawsuit, see supra notes
63-64 and accompanying text.
111. See Ingram v. Travelers Ins. Co., 78 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 1996) (referring to uncited
laws in Indiana and Illinois); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-22-14 (Michie 2000). See
generally LEE R. Russ, COUCH ON INSURANCE §§ 235:9-:17 (3d ed., West Group
2000).
112. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 514(b)(2)(A), 29
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000).
113. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 740-47 (1985) (finding
that ERISA does not pre-empt law requiring inclusion of certain benefit provi-
sions in health insurance contracts bought by ERISA plans).
114. ERISA plan administrators run plans according to plan terms, unless those
terms conflict with ERISA. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act
§ 404(a)(1)(D) (requiring fiduciaries to operate plans in accordance with plan
terms to the extent the provisions are consistent with ERISA). Circuit courts
have upheld contractual limitations in benefits due lawsuits. See Fontana v. Di-
versified Group Admin., Inc., 67 Fed. Appx. 722 (3d Cir. 2003) (health plan); Wil-
kins v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 299 F.3d 945 (8th Cir. 2002) (disability
plan); Santino v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2001)
(disability plan); Clark v. NBD Bank, 3 Fed. Appx. 500 (6th Cir. 2001) (disability
plan); Ferguson v. William Wrigley Jr. Co., 17 Fed. Appx. 421 (7th Cir. 2001)
(disability plan); Cole v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union-Employer
Health & Welfare Fund, 238 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision)
(health plan); I.V. Servs. of Am., Inc. v. Inn Dev. & Mgmt., Inc., 182 F.3d 51 (1st
Cir. 1999) (health plan); Moore v. Berg Enters., Inc., 201 F.3d 448 (10th Cir.
1999) (unpublished table decision) (disability plan); Duchek v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Neb., 153 F.3d 648 (8th Cir. 1998) (health plan); Northlake Reg'l Med.
Ctr. v. Waffle House Sys. Employee Benefit Plan, 160 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 1998)
(health plan); Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 112 F.3d 869 (7th
Cir. 1997) (health plan); Blaske v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 131 F.3d 763 (8th Cir.
1997) (disability plan); Ingram v. Travelers Ins. Co., 78 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 1996)
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All of the circuit courts, except the First Circuit, trace this limita-
tions rule to the Seventh Circuit's Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
United of Wisconsin. 115 The Doe Court faced a plan provision requir-
ing a denied beneficiary to bring a benefits due lawsuit within three-
years of filing the claim with the plan administrator. 116 Rather than
use the state six-year statute of limitations for written contracts appli-
cable to the benefits due lawsuit in that circuit,"l 7 Doe noted that the
Supreme Court, under basic contract law, allowed parties to select
limitation periods provided the limitation periods were reasonable. 1 18
Presumably, the same rule applies for a federal cause of action under
ERISA. 1 19 Doe also noted that this decision concurred with the only
district court decision on the matter.12 0
The court in Doe did not concern itself much with reasonableness.
A limitations period loosely paralleling state insurance law121 and
ERISA's breach of fiduciary duty statutory limitations122 must be rea-
sonable. All of the circuit courts' opinions involving contractual limi-
tations dealt with a three-year limitations period, except one.12 3 That
circuit court held that a ninety-day limitations period contained in a
Summary Plan Description124 was reasonable. The limitations period
was not a subterfuge to avoid a lawsuit, was consistent with the fed-
(disability plan). Circuit courts have upheld contractual limitations in delin-
quent employer contribution lawsuits. See Crews v. Cent. States, Southeast &
Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 788 F.2d 332 (6th Cir. 1986).
115. 112 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, J.). For the Third Circuit, see Fontana, 67
Fed. Appx. 722, for the Sixth Circuit, see Clark, 3 Fed. Appx. 500, for the Eighth
Circuit, see Duchek, 153 F.3d 648, and for the Eleventh Circuit, see Northlake,
160 F.3d 1301. All of these cases cite to Doe.
116. Doe, 112 F.3d at 872-73.
117. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 893.43 (West 1997). See Jenkins v. Local 705 Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters Pension Plan, 713 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1983) (applying an Illinois ten-
year statute of limitations for written contracts to an employee benefit pension
plan action).
118. Doe, 112 F.3d at 874 (citing United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586
(1947)) (diversity action for a pre-ERISA death benefit).
119. Cf Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 404(a)(1)(D) (fiduciary must dis-
charge duties in accordance with plan documents to the extent they are consis-
tent with ERISA).
120. Doe, 112 F.3d at 875 (citing Chilcote v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 841 F.
Supp. 877 (E.D. Wis. 1993)).
121. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
122. For the ERISA statutory limitations provision, see infra note 245 and accompa-
nying text.
123. See Northlake Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Waffle House Sys. Employee Benefit Plan, 160
F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 1998).
124. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 102 (each beneficiary shall re-
ceive a copy of the summary plan description); see also generally BRUCE, supra
note 11, at 397-98 (suggesting that summary plan descriptions can effectively
become the plan, either as interpretative of ambiguous provisions or as an estop-
pel to enforcing contrary plan provisions).
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eral policy to resolve the claims process with dispatch, 125 and in any
subsequent lawsuit the beneficiary could not could introduce addi-
tional evidence.12 6
C. Origins of the State Statute of Limitations Rule
The use of state statues of limitations for ERISA derives from the
practice under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
("LMRA").127 To prevent bribery payments to union officials, the
LMRA provides various requirements for the multiemployer plans of
unions, including operating them solely for the benefit of partici-
pant-beneficiaries.1 28 The circuit courts have implied a benefits due
lawsuit under LMRA section 302,129 as well as LMRA section 301,130
for enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement, both for fail-
ure to operate a multiemployer plan for the sole benefit of
participant-beneficiaries.
125. Cf Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985) (citing 29 C.F.R.
§ 2560.503-1(h)(1)(i) (2003)) (Department of Labor regulation for appeals of de-
nied benefits by the plan administrator).
126. Some circuit courts, for a review of the plan administrator's decision, do not con-
sider evidence not before the plan administrator. See, e.g., Krizek v. Cigna Group
Ins., 345 F.3d 91, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2003); Liston v. Unum Corp. Officer Severance
Plan, 330 F.3d 19, 23-24 (1st Cir. 2003).
127. Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1948)
(codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (2001)).
128. See Labor Management Relations Act § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1998).
129. See, e.g., Johnson v. Botica, 537 F.2d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 1976) (former employee
sued to challenge denial of disability pension); Lugo v. Employees Ret. Fund of
the Illumination Prod. Indus., 529 F.2d 251, 254-56 (2d Cir. 1976) (former em-
ployee sued for declaration and injunctive relief for denial of disability pension);
Pete v. United Mine Workers Welfare & Ret. Fund, 517 F.2d 1267, 1269-70 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (former employee sued to review pension benefit denial), reh'g granted,
517 F.2d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Kiser v. Huge, 517 F.2d 1237, 1244-45 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (class action brought to review denial of pension benefits), reh'g granted
sub nom. Kiser v. Boyle, 517 F.2d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Kosty v. Lewis, 319 F.2d
744, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (union member sued trustees to determine eligibility for
pension).
130. See, e.g., Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1976) (widow sued
trustees for survivor's benefits); Smith v. Union Carbide Corp., 350 F.2d 258, 268
(6th Cir. 1965) (former employee sued for denied pension benefit); Rhine v. Union
Carbide Corp., 343 F.2d 12, 15-16 (6th Cir. 1965) (former employee sued for de-
nied disability benefit); Int'l Union, UAW v. Textron, Inc., 312 F.2d 688, 691 (6th
Cir. 1963) (union action on behalf of employees to determine their rights in termi-
nated plan); accord Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am. v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 176-77 n.17 (1971) (dictum in unfair labor practice case);
Beam v. Int'l Org. of Masters, 511 F.2d 975, 978 (2d Cir. 1975) (spouse of de-
ceased union member sought denied accidental death benefits); see also Labor
Management Relations Act § 301. See generally Flint, supra note 14, at 365-68
(explaining the structural violation theory and fiduciary breach, benefits due,
and delinquent employer contribution lawsuits under both LMRA sections 301
and 302).
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The earliest issues involving statutes of limitations under ERISA
for the benefits due lawsuit, the employer retaliatory discrimination
lawsuit, and the delinquent employer contributions due lawsuit all in-
volved multiemployer plans brought under LMRA section 301. The
earliest informational penalty lawsuit and the earliest action for equi-
table remedy to enforce plan provisions followed these precedents.
1. The Informational Penalty Lawsuit
The circuit courts for the informational penalty lawsuit follow the
state statute of limitations rule they have adopted for the employer
retaliatory discrimination lawsuit.131
2. The Benefits Due Lawsuit
Of the ten circuit courts to consider a benefits due lawsuit, seven of
the circuits' cases of first impression are traced to the Seventh Cir-
cuit's Jenkins v. Local 705 International Brotherhood of Teamsters
Pension Plan. 13 2 Jenkins involved a multiemployer pension plan sub-
ject to both LMRA and ERISA.133 Previous courts for the benefits due
lawsuit under LMRA section 301 used the state statute of limitations
for written contracts.134 For the benefits due lawsuit, the Jenkins
court noted that ERISA's legislative history referred to LMRA.135
131. See Hatteberg v. Red Adair Co. Employees' Profit Sharing Plan, 79 Fed. Appx.
709 (5th Cir. 2003); Moore v. Berg Enter., Inc., 201 F.3d 448 (10th Cir. 1999)
(citing the employer retaliatory discrimination case Held v. Mfrs. Hanover Leas-
ing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1990)); Stone v. Travelers Corp., 58 F.3d 434
(9th Cir. 1995) (citing the employer retaliatory discrimination case Felton v.
Unisource Corp., 940 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1991)).
132. 713 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1983). The six other circuits are the Fourth Circuit, see
Dameron v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 815 F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing
Jenkins, 713 F.2d 247), the Eighth Circuit, see Anderson v. John Morrell & Co.,
830 F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing Jenkins, 713 F.2d 247), the Tenth Circuit, see
Wright v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 925 F.2d 1288 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Trs.
Of Wyo. Laborers Health & Welfare Plan v. Morgen & Oswood Constr. Co., 850
F.2d 613 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing Cent. States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pen-
sion Fund v. Kraftco, Inc., 799 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Jenkins, 713 F.2d
247)), the Fifth Circuit, see Kennedy v. Electricians Pension Plan IBEW No. 995,
954 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Anderson, 830 F.2d 872), the Sixth Circuit,
see Meade v. Pension Appeals & Review Comm., 966 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1992)
(citing Dameron, 815 F.2d 975; Anderson, 830 F.2d 872), and the Ninth Circuit,
see Flanagan v. Inland Empire Elec. Workers Pension Plan & Trust, 3 F.3d 1246
(9th Cir. 1993) (citing Dameron, 815 F.2d 975; Meade, 966 F.2d 190; Wright, 925
F.2d 1288).
133. Two other of the seven cases of first impression derived from Jenkins also in-
volved multiemployer plans subject to both ERISA and LMRA. See Flanagan, 3
F.3d 1246; Kennedy, 954 F.2d 1116.
134. See, e.g., Martin v. Constr. Laborer's Pension Trust for S. Cal., 947 F.2d 1381 (9th
Cir. 1991) (citing CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 337 (West 1991)).
135. Jenkins, 713 F.2d at 250. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280, at 76-77 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5107 ("All such actions [ERISA section 502]
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Without considering whether ERISA changed this LMRA law with
respect to the benefits due lawsuit, the Jenkins court recognized that
the LMRA rule was to use "the most appropriate state statute of limi-
tations." 136 The Jenkins court then determined which of a myriad of
states' statutes of limitations applied to the ERISA benefits due law-
suit. Since Illinois had the most contacts with the action, the court
decided the appropriate state to consider was Illinois.137
The choice of law rules only aggravate the amount of litigation
needed for the most analogous state statute of limitations rule.138
The court in Jenkins noted that, since the ERISA claims process dif-
fered significantly from the arbitration process of Illinois state labor
law, the labor law statutes of limitations did not apply.139 The court
decided that the ERISA plan most resembled a written contract,140 so
the most appropriate state statute of limitations was the ten-year
statute of limitations for lawsuits on written contracts.141 The court
also noted that this decision agreed with three other district courts'
decisions.142
One of the other circuit court's case of first impression traced to the
same Supreme Court opinion used by the Jenkins court. 143 The other
in federal or state court are to be regarded as arising under the laws of the United
States in similar fashion as those brought under section 301 of the La-
bor-Management Relations Act of 1947."); see also 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1998).
136. Jenkins, 713 F.2d at 250 (citing Int'l Union, UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383
U.S. 696, 705 (1966) (involving recovery of benefits under a vacation pay plan by
a union)). The Jenkins court also cited United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451
U.S. 56 (1981), which involved an employee suing both the union and employer
for wrongful discharge after seventeen months, for the state statute of limitations
rule. But, United Parcel Service left open the issue of whether the six-month
statute of limitations for wrongful discharge-fair representation hybrid cases
under section 10 of the NLRA applied rather than some state's law. The Su-
preme Court later determined in favor of the federal six-month statute of limita-
tions. See DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
137. Jenkins, 713 F.2d at 251. The court noted that the plan administration occurred
in Illinois, the agent for service of process had its office in Illinois, plan headquar-
ters were in Illinois, and plan investment agents were in Illinois.
138. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
139. Jenkins, 713 F.2d at 252. The court noted the ninety-day period to vacate arbi-
tration awards under Illinois law, see 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12 (West
2005), and the six-month statute of limitations for wrongful discharge-fair repre-
sentation hybrid cases under section 10 of the NLRA, as mandated by
DelCostello.
140. Jenkins, 713 F.2d at 252.
141. Id. at 253 (citing 735 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-206 (West 2003)).
142. Id. (citing Livolsi v. City of New Castle, 50 F. Supp. 1146 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Mor-
gan v. Laborers Pension Trust Fund for N. Cal., 433 F. Supp. 518 (N.D. Cal.
1977)).
143. See Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 960 F.2d 1168 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Teamsters Pen-
sion Trust Funds of Philadelphia & Vicinity v. John Tinney Delivery Serv., Inc.,
732 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing Int'l Union, UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,
383 U.S. 696 (1966))).
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two circuit courts did not even attempt to use federal retirement plan
cases to determine the statute of limitations rule. Rather, these cir-
cuit courts seized the state statute of limitations rule from other fed-
eral statutes, as if this was a universal rule regardless of federal
policy.144
3. The Equitable Remedy Lawsuit to Enforce Plan Provisions
The circuit courts for the now partially disallowed plan recovery to
enforce plan provision lawsuits followed the state statute of limita-
tions rule they have adopted for the benefits due lawsuit, the employer
delinquent contribution lawsuit, and the employer retaliatory discrim-
ination lawsuit. 145
4. The Employer Retaliatory Discrimination Lawsuit
Of the ten circuit courts to consider an employer retaliatory dis-
crimination lawsuit, eight of the circuit courts' cases of first impres-
sion are traced to the same LMRA Supreme Court opinion used by the
Jenkins Court for the benefits due lawsuit. 146 That LMRA opinion
144. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v. Sanders, 138 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1998)
(citing an employer discrimination case under ERISA section 510, Clark v. Coats
& Clark, Inc., 865 F.2d 1237 (11th Cir. 1989), which cites a Civil Rights Act of
1871 case, Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985)); Miles v. N.Y. State Teamsters
Pension & Ret. Fund Employee Benefit Plan, 698 F.2d 593 (2d Cir 1983) (citing
Kosty v. Lewis, 319 F.2d 744, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (assuming the D.C. Code's
three-year residual claim statute of limitations applied to a benefits due lawsuit
under LMRA)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003) (Civil Rights Act of 1871).
145. See Admin. Comm. of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Soles ex rel. Estate of Hollander,
336 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Johnson v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co.
of America, 942 F.2d 1260 (8th Cir. 1991) (benefits case)); Sanders, 138 F.3d 1347
(citing Clark, 865 F.2d 1237 (employer retaliatory discrimination case)); Wang
Labs., Inc. v. Kagan, 990 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Pierce County Hotel
Employees & Rest. Employees Health Trust v. Elks Lodge, B.P.O.E. No. 1450,
827 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1987) (employer delinquent contribution case)); Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Alab. v. Weitz, 913 F.2d 1544 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing
Clark, 865 F.2d 1237 (employer retaliatory discrimination case)).
146. The Supreme Court case was Int'l Union, UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383
U.S. 696 (1966), which involved a union suing the employer for vacation pay for
employees after seven years. The eight circuits are the Eighth Circuit, see Heide-
man v. PFL, Inc., 904 F.2d 1262 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing Johnson v. Ry. Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (citing Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696)), the
Tenth Circuit, see Held v. Mfrs. Hanover Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir.
1990) (citing Trs. for Alaska Laborers-Constr. Indus. Health & Sec. Fund v. Fer-
rell, 812 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696)),
the Fifth Circuit, see McClure v. Zoecon, Inc., 936 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing
Heideman, 904 F.2d 1262; Held, 912 F.2d 1197), the Ninth Circuit, see Felton v.
Unisource Corp., 940 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Heideman, 904 F.2d 1262;
Held, 912 F.2d 1197), the Seventh Circuit, see Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 977
F.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Heideman, 904 F.2d 1262; Held, 912 F.2d 1197;
McClure, 936 F.2d 777), the Sixth Circuit, see Taylor v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
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dealt with benefits due, not employer retaliatory discrimination. Nev-
ertheless, these circuit courts ignored this distinction, or assumed it
made no difference. Had these eight circuit courts considered the
LMRA practice for employer retaliatory discrimination, they might
have used a different statute of limitations rule. The LMRA practice
for employer retaliatory discrimination under LMRA section 301 was
to use the federal six-month statute of limitations contained in the
NLRA.147
However, the use of state statutes of limitations was so ingrained
in the federal circuit courts that the other two circuit courts, the two
earliest to consider the employer retaliatory discrimination lawsuit,
avoided the LMRA practice and opted to use the Civil Rights Act of
1871 as the authority for using the state statute of limitations rule.148
Being a congressional statute passed one hundred years before ER-
ISA, and the first retirement plan,149 it is highly unlikely to have re-
flected the federal policy for employee benefit plans required for the
statute of limitations consideration mandated by the Supreme
Court.150
5. The Delinquent Employer Contribution Lawsuit
Of the eight circuit courts to consider a delinquent employer contri-
bution lawsuit, all eight circuit courts' cases of first impression are
Co., 38 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Held, 912 F.2d 1197; McClure, 936 F.2d
777; Felton, 940 F.2d 503; Tolle, 977 F.2d 1129), the Second Circuit, see Sandberg
v. KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP, 111 F.3d 331 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Held, 912 F.2d
1197; McClure, 936 F.2d 777), and the First Circuit, see Muldoon v. C.J. Muldoon
& Sons, 278 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Held, 912 F.2d 1197; McClure, 936
F.2d 777; Taylor, 38 F.3d 1216; Sandberg, 111 F.3d 331).
147. See DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983) (wrongful termina-
tion against employer for refusing to drive unsafe vehicle in violation of collective
bargaining agreement and breach of fair representation duty for mishandling
grievance); 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1998). Before DelCostello, the LMRA practice had
lurched in the direction of adopting the state statute of limitations rule. See
United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981) (rejecting the NLRA six-
month statute of limitations urged by amicus briefs since the parties did not raise
the issue, and accepting the parties' most analogous state statute of limitations
rule); Buscemi v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 736 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984) (follow-
ing the United Parcel Service rule and using the state statute of limitations rule
for an LMRA employer retaliatory discrimination lawsuit).
148. See Clark, 865 F.2d 1237 (citing Wilson, 471 U.S. 261); Gavalik v. Cont'l Can Co.,
812 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing Wilson, 471 U.S. 261); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003)
(Civil Rights Act of 1871). The Third Circuit faced lawyers knowledgeable in the
LMRA practice, so the Third Circuit went into a lengthy explanation on why they
rejected the six-month statute of limitations for LMRA employer retaliatory dis-
crimination lawsuits, none of which involves the federal policy behind ERISA.
See Gavelik, 812 F.2d at 846-49.
149. The first retirement plan was that of American Express in 1875. See WILLIAM C.
GREENOUGH & FRANCIS P. KING, PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 27 (1976).
150. For the mandate, see infra notes 215-33 and accompanying text.
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traced to the same LMRA opinion used by the Jenkins Court for the
benefits due lawsuit. 1 5t That LMRA opinion of course dealt with ben-
efits due, not delinquent employer contributions. But these circuit
courts ignored this distinction, or assumed it made no difference. The
LMRA practice for delinquent employer contributions under LMRA
section 301 was to use the state statute of limitations for written con-
tracts. 15 2 Again, none of these circuit courts bothered to consider
whether ERISA's policy behind the delinquent employer contribution
lawsuit impacted the LMRA state statute of limitations rule. Each
circuit court concluded that state law provided the limitations period.
Then without considering the federal policy behind ERISA's lawsuit
for delinquent employer contributions, seven of these circuit courts de-
termined that the state statute of limitations for written contracts ap-
plied. The eighth opted for a wage collection statute of limitations. 153
III. DETERMINATIVE PRINCIPLES
The contention that the adoption of the state statutes of limitations
by the federal circuit courts was ill-conceived raises the question of
what principle should be used to determine a statute of limitations for
ERISA actions not involving plan recovery of damages arising from a
fiduciary duty breach. The answer lies in an examination of ERISA's
legislative history and the Supreme Court's methodology for deter-
mining non-statutory limitations periods.
151. The Supreme Court case was Int'l Union, UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383
U.S. 696 (1966), which involved a union suing the employer for vacation pay for
employees after seven years. The eight circuits are the Second Circuit, see
O'Hare v. Gen. Marine Transp. Corp., 740 F.2d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 1984), the Third
Circuit, see Teamsters Pension Trust Funds of Philadelphia & Vicinity v. John
Tinney Delivery Serv., Inc., 732 F.2d 319, 322 (3d Cir. 1984), the Sixth Circuit,
see Cent. States Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Kraftco, Inc., 799
F.2d 1098, 1105 (6th Cir. 1986), the Seventh Circuit, see Trs. of the Operative
Plasterers' & Cement Masons' Local Union Officers & Employees Pension Fund
v. Journeyman Plasters' Protective & Benevolent Soc'y, Local Union No. 5, 794
F.2d 1217, 1221 (7th Cir. 1986), the Ninth Circuit, see Trs. for Alaska Laborers-
Constr. Indus. Health & Sec. Fund v. Ferrell, 812 F.2d 512 (citing O'Hare, 740
F.2d 160; Teamsters Pension Trust Funds of Philadelphia & Vicinity, 732 F.2d
319), the Eighth Circuit, see Robbins v. Iowa Rd. Builders Co., 828 F.2d 1348 (8th
Cir. 1987) (citing Ferrell, 812 F.2d 512; O'Hare, 740 F.2d 160; Teamsters Pension
Trust Funds of Philadelphia & Vicinity, 732 F.2d 319; Trs. of the Operative, 794
F.2d 1217), the Tenth Circuit, see Trs. of Wyo. Laborers Health & Welfare Plan v.
Morgen & Osgood Constr. Co., Inc. of Wyo., 850 F.2d 613 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing
O'Hare, 740 F.2d 160; Ferrell, 812 F.2d 512; Kraftco, 799 F.2d 1098), and the D.C.
Circuit, see Connors v. Hallmark & Son Coal Co., 935 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(citing Ferrell, 812 F.2d 512).
152. See, e.g., Waggoner v. Dallaire, 649 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 337 (West 1991)).
153. See Teamsters Pension Trust Funds of Philadelphia & Vicinity, 732 F.2d at 322.
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A. ERISA's Legislative History
ERISA's legislative history contains two strands that suggest the
applicability of state statutes of limitations to non-fiduciary ERISA
actions is not correct. An additional strand indicates that the statute
of limitations for contract law is not the most analogous state statute
of limitations. The Supreme Court has interpreted one strand, seem-
ingly authorizing the use of the LMRA rule, to mean that state rules
do not apply to ERISA matters. Another strand favors ERISA uni-
formity throughout the land, especially for interstate plans. The third
strand indicates that trust law-although more confusing than con-
tract law with respect to a state's statute of limitations-is more ap-
propriate than contract law.
1. The Mandate to Use the LMRA Practice
ERISA's legislative history demonstrates that lawsuits to enforce
benefit rights or to recover benefits, the benefits due lawsuit, arises in
the same fashion as previous pension cases under LMRA:
[Sluits to enforce benefit rights under the plan or to recover benefits under the
plan which do not involve application of [ERISA's] provisions . . . may be
brought.., also in State courts .... All such action in Federal or State courts
are to be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States in similar
fashion to those brought under section 301 of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act of 1947.154
At first glance, this language seems to support the approach of the
Jenkins court, at least for the benefits due lawsuit. But other legisla-
tive history indicates that this language means that, since ERISA
preempts state law, the courts must develop a uniform federal com-
mon law for the action.X55 Consequently, when the Supreme Court
154. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280, at 76-77 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5038, 5107; see also 120 CONG. REC. 29,933 (1974), reprinted in 3 SUBCOMM. ON
LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR & PUBLIC WELFARE, 94TH CONG., 2D
SEsS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT
OF 1974, at 4745 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (state-
ment of Sen. Williams, then chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare and co-sponsor of the original draft of the ERISA legislation: "It is
intended that such [ERISA benefits due] actions will be regarded as arising
under the laws of the United States, in similar fashion to those brought under
s[ection] 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act."). See generally Flint,
supra note 13, at 973 (discussing the possible meanings of the LMRA reference).
155. See 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 154, at 4771 (statement of Sen. Javits, ranking Republican on the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and the other co-sponsor of the original
ERISA legislation, after mentioning the ERISA preemption, explained: "It is also
intended that a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to
deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pen-
sion plans.").
2005]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
references the LMRA in ERISA's legislative history, it usually is in
connection with preemption.156
The one time the Supreme Court faced the issue of blindly incorpo-
rating an LMRA rule into an ERISA action using the arbitrary and
capricious rule, the Supreme Court rejected the approach.' 5 7 The Su-
preme Court's reason centered around the differing structures of the
statutes. LMRA did not expressly provide for a remedy while ERISA
did.158 The Supreme Court then turned to ERISA's legislative history
concerning incorporation of trust law principles to adopt the abuse of
discretion standard.' 5 9 Therefore, the federal circuit courts' approach,
typified in Jenkins, is wrong. Rather than blindly adopting a rule
from the LMRA practice for ERISA, the courts should investigate the
structure and policy behind ERISA.
2. The Mandate for Interstate Uniformity
In particular, one ERISA policy deals with national uniformity of
ERISA rules. It was the alleged absence of this policy that doomed the
LMRA practice to the most analogous state statute of limitations
rule.16o In International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), AFL-CIO v. Hoo-
sier Cardinal Corp., 161 the union urged the Court to devise a uniform
limitations period for lawsuits under LMRA section 301, which in-
cludes collectively bargained employee benefit plans, to fill the gap left
by Congress rather than affirm the state statute of limitations applied
156. See Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2495-96 (2004) (preempting the
Texas Health Care Act); Unum Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 377 n.7 (2003)
(deciding not to preempt California's notice prejudice rule for insurance); Inger-
sol-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 144--45 (1990) (preempting the Texas
wrongful termination action based on avoidance of pension contribution); Metro.
Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-67 (1987) (finding that an ERISA action
for employer retaliatory discrimination disguised as state action removable to
federal court); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 55-57 (1987) (preempt-
ing Mississippi law of bad-faith claims processing).
157. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109-10 (1989). The
Company claimed the LMRA rule applied because ERISA codified the strict fidu-
ciary standards in section 302 of LMRA. Id. (citing NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453
U.S. 322, 332 (1981)).
158. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 109-10 (noting that the LMRA ac-
tion for benefits due was based on a failure to operate the plan for the sole and
exclusive benefit of the employees, which was an actionable violation).
159. See id. at 110-11. The distinction between the "arbitrary and capricious" rule
and the "abuse of discretion" rule may be meaningless. The standard for the first
portion of the abuse of discretion rule is the same as for the arbitrary and capri-
cious rule and the remaining portion, for "bad faith", courts frequently appended
to the arbitrary and capricious rule. See Flint, supra note 11, at 148-50, 157
n.106.
160. See Int'l Union, UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
161. Id.
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by the lower courts. 162 The Court, lead by Justice Stewart, noted for
this federal cause of action, principles of federal labor law superseded
incompatible state law doctrines if state statutes of limitations ap-
plied to LMRA section 301 actions would lack uniformity, and the sub-
ject matter of LMRA section 301 actions called for uniform law.163
But then Justice Stewart claimed that prior Supreme Court cases
ruled that the need for uniformity with respect to collective bargaining
agreements applied only to the negotiation and administration of the
collective bargaining agreements. 16 4 Federal labor law focused on
promoting negotiation of collective bargaining agreements and private
settlement of disputes, while limitations periods only applied after the
parties had abandoned these two policies.16 5 Therefore, Justice Stew-
art reasoned that adoption of states' statutes of limitations would not
violate any federal labor policy.'16 6
To bolster this conclusion, Justice Stewart provided two additional
observations. First, Congress intentionally left LMRA section 301 ac-
tions without a statute of limitations after they had considered use of
statutes of limitations for certain NLRA causes of action. 16 7 Second,
failure to incorporate a limitations statute meant the federal courts
should follow their practice (used since the 1830s) of adopting state
statutes of limitations for federal causes of action.168
162. Id. at 701.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 701-02 (citing Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95,
103-04 (1962)).
165. Id. at 702.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 703. Congress adopted a six-month statute of limitations for unfair labor
practice actions brought by the staff of the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") before the NLRB. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. NLRB
allows any party, including employees, to bring the action. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.9
(2003) ("made by any person"); see also Hotel & Rest. Employees Local 28, 252
N.L.R.B. 1124, 1125 (1980) (charged employer with retaliatory discrimination);
King Snoopers, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 1011, 1011 (1976). Compare 93 CONG. REC.
3323 (1947) (statement of Sen. Wagner claiming the six-month limitations as a
tool to destroy labor unions by encouraging unscrupulous employers to conceal
their actions for six months), and 93 CONG. REC. 4030 (1947) (statement of Sen.
Murray decrying the six-month limitations as the shortest statute of limitations
known to man again encouraging employers to conceal their commission of unfair
labor practices), with 93 CONG. REC. 4283 (1947) (statement of Sen. Smith noting
that the six-month limitations comes from the practice of the Democrats' own
N.R.L.B.).
168. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. at 703-04 (citing McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S.
(3 Pet.) 270 (1830)). See McCluny, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 277 (stating the rule for
failure to register under the 1796 act for sale of land in the Northwest Territory:
'[Ulnder [the Judiciary Act of 1789], the acts of limitations of the several states,
where no special provision has been made by Congress, form a rule of decision in
the courts of the United States."). The basis for the rule lay with section 34 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1861) ("[T]hat the laws of the several states,
except where the constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall oth-
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ERISA, however, has a need for lawsuit uniformity. ERISA con-
tains a preemption provision, the function of which is to create federal
uniformity with respect to the administration of employee benefit
plans by plan administrators:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this sub-
chapter [Title I-Protection of Employee Benefit Rights] and subchapter III
[Title IV-Plan Termination Insurance] of this chapter shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section
1003(b) of this title. 16 9
This desire to create uniformity without reference to state law ap-
peared in committee reports and statements of committee members.
The report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare indi-
cated that Congress intended ERISA preemption to create uniformity
in employee benefit law in order to give interstate plan fiduciaries cer-
tainty about the legality of their actions without reference to varying
state laws:
erwise provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in
the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.") (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994)). Justice Stewart claimed the court had reviewed and
readopted the rule in 1895 and had repeatedly followed it. Hoosier Cardinal
Corp., 383 U.S. at 704 (citing Campbell v. City of Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895)
(applying state stature of limitations to decide infringement on letters patent
under Patent Act as revised in 1874 by the United States, REVISED STATUTES OF
THE UNITED STATES, §§ 5596, 5599 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Of-
fice 1878))). See McClaire v. Rankin, 197 U.S. 154 (1905) (applying state statute
of limitations to the National Bank Act, codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947); O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S.
318 (1911) (citing Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994)); Chattanooga
Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906) (Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1997)). All of these opinions state the rule as state law determines
the statute of limitations for federal causes of action where Congress has speci-
fied no statute of limitations. Cf Runyan v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994)). Justice Stewart also noted that
when Congress disagreed with the Supreme Court's rule, Congress passed acts
overturning the rule by enacting uniform statutes of limitations. Hoosier Cardi-
nal Corp., 383 U.S. at 703; see 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1997) (creating four-year limita-
tions period for the Clayton Act in 1955); 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2001) (creating six-year
limitations period for the Patent Act in 1870); Herget v. Cent. Bank Co., 324 U.S.
4, 7 (1945) (describing the 1938 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act to clarify the
federal statute of limitations exclusion of state statutes of limitation). Such has
happened to the Civil Rights Act of 1870. Congress passed a residual four-year
statute of limitations for all acts enacted after Dec. 1, 1990. See 28 U.S.C. § 1658
(1994). Congress amended the Civil Rights Act of 1870 in 1991, see Pub. L. No.
102-168, 105 Stat. 1071 (1992), thereby replacing the old state statute of limita-
tion rule with the federal residual statute of limitations. See Jones v. R.R. Don-
nelly & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 368, 379-84 (2004).
169. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 514(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a) (2000).
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Furthermore, a fiduciary standard embodied in Federal legislation is con-
sidered desirable because it will bring a measure of uniformity in an area
where decisions under the same set of facts may differ from state ....
Finally, it is evident that the operations of employee benefit plans are in-
creasingly interstate. The uniformity of decision which the Act is designed to
foster will help administrators, fiduciaries and participants to predict the le-
gality of proposed actions without the necessity of reference to varying state
laws ....
... [S]tate law is preempted. Because of the interstate character of em-
ployee benefit plans, the Committee believes it essential to provide for a uni-
form source of law in the areas of vesting, funding, insurance and portability
standards, for evaluating fiduciary conduct, and for creating a single report-
ing and disclosure system in lieu of burdensome multiple reports.1 7
0
Certainly, varying state limitations periods would violate this direc-
tive and muddle an interstate plan administrator's decision with re-
spect to a lawsuit filed for a claim under the plan. The corresponding
report of the House Committee on Education and Labor stated that
ERISA alone was the uniform source of law for removing state proce-
dural obstacles from enforcement of fiduciary standards and recovery
of benefits:
The intent of the Committee is to provide the full range of legal and equitable
remedies available in both state and federal courts and to remove jurisdic-
tional and procedural obstacles with in the past appear to have hampered ef-
fective enforcement of fiduciary responsibilities under state law for recovery of
benefits due to participants ....
Except where plans are not subject to this Act and in certain other enu-
merated circumstances, state law is preempted. Because of the interstate
character of employee benefit plans, the committee believes it essential to pro-
vide for a uniform source of law in the areas of vesting, funding, insurance and
portability standards, for evaluation of fiduciary conduct, and for creating a
single reporting and disclosure system in lieu of burdensome multiple reports
171
This indicates Congress considered courthouse procedural rules, one
of which is the statute of limitations period,172 and intended that ER-
ISA preempt state law for such determinations. Statements of ER-
170. S. REP. No. 93-127, at 29, 35 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4865,
4871 (emphasis added).
171. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 12, 17 (1974); reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4650, 4655 (emphasis added).
172. Compare Sun Oil Co. v. Hartman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988) (stating that states' stat-
utes of limitations are "procedural" for purposes of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause), with Guarantee Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (stating that
states' statutes of limitations are "substantive" for purposes of diversity actions
under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). The federal law applicable to
LMRA actions is substantive, see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448, 456 (1957), and the LMRA substantive rules require uniformity, see
Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962). Yet the Su-
preme Court declined to determine whether statutes of limitations are procedural
or substantive for the LMRA. See Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. at 703 n.4.
Since the Supreme Court ruled for a non-uniform LMRA limitations period, the
limitations period for LMRA is not substantive.
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ISA's congressional sponsors similarly stated that uniformity required
the elimination of state law regulating employee benefit plans. 173
The Supreme Court has interpreted this legislative history for uni-
formity as not only applying to plan provisions and plan administra-
tion, but also to ERISA lawsuits. The Supreme Court early on
emphasized that the ERISA preemption provision applies to the reme-
dies available under ERISA and eliminated state causes of action with
respect to employee benefit plans.174 The reason behind this rule is to
avoid burdening the plan administrator with conflicting directives
from differing states.17 5 This desire to provide employee benefit plans
uniform causes of actions under ERISA includes court procedural mat-
ters. The Supreme Court has even singled out state choice of law
173. See 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 154, at 4771 (statement of Sen. Javits that "the interests of uniformity ...
required" that the ERISA preemption provision provide for "the displacement of
State action in the field of private employee benefit programs"); 120 CONG. REC.
29,933 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 154, at 4745
(statement of Sen. Williams that ERISA preemption is to eliminate "the threat of
conflicting or inconsistent state and local regulation of employee benefit plans");
120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
154, at 4670 (statement of Rep. Dent that ERISA preemption is to reserve "to
Federal authority the sole power to regulate the field of employee benefit plans").
Senator Harrison Williams, Senator Jacob Javits, and Representative John Dent
served on ERISA's Conference Committee. See Donald T. Bogan, Protecting Pa-
tient Rights Despite ERISA: Will the Supreme Court Allow States to Regulate
Managed Care?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 950, 908 (2000). Javits was a Senate co-sponsor
of the original ERISA draft legislation and senior ranking member on the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Williams was the other co-sponsor and
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, and Dent was
the House sponsor and second ranking Democrat on the House Committee on
Education and Labor. See George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Non-Waivability of Pre-
emption, 39 U. KAN. L. REV. 297, 340, 345-46 (1991).
174. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987) ("The expectations that
a federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans
would develop . . . would make little sense if the remedies available to ERISA
participants and beneficiaries under section 514(a) could be supplemented or sup-
planted by varying state law."). Dedeaux declared state bad faith processing
claims under ERISA preempted.
175. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990) ("Section 514(a)
was intended to insure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uni-
form body of benefits law; the goal was to minimize the administrative and finan-
cial burden of complying with conflicting directives among states or between
states and the federal government .... Allowing state based action like the one
at issue here would subject plans and plan sponsors to burdens not unlike those
that Congress sought to foreclose through 514(a) .... It is foreseeable that state
courts, exercising their common law powers, might develop different substantive
standards applicable to the same employer conduct, requiring the tailoring of
plans and employer conduct to the peculiarities of the law of each jurisdiction.
Such an outcome is fundamentally at odds with the goal of uniformity that Con-
gress sought to employment."). McClendon determined that ERISA preempted a
state wrongful termination lawsuit based on avoiding compliance with ERISA.
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rules, such as are involved in determining a state statute of limita-
tions for interstate employee benefit plans, as one of the lawsuit proce-
dural rules eliminated by ERISA preemption.176 More recently, the
Supreme Court has indicated that ERISA preemption applies to law-
suit remedial orders and awards.17 7 Most assuredly, these principles
would apply to an interstate plan with similarly situated employees in
different states to bar a state's lengthy statute of limitations to enable
recovery of a benefit for one employee unavailable to the other em-
ployee in a state with a short statute of limitations.
Once before, the federal circuit courts attempted to impose state
law on plan administrator decisions. For instance, bankruptcy law ex-
cludes from the bankrupt estate assets in a spendthrift trust.17 8 The
Fifth Circuit,' 7 9 in a widely followed opinion, 8 0 ruled that to deter-
mine whether an ERISA retirement plan, which is required to contain
176. See Egelhoffv. Egelhoffex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 148-50 (2001). Uniformity
is impossible, however, if plans are subject to different legal obligations in differ-
ent states.
The Washington statute at issue here poses that threat. Plan adminis-
trators cannot make payment simply by identifying the beneficiary spec-
ified by the plan documents. Instead they must familiarize themselves
with state statutes so they can determine whether the named benefici-
ary's status has been "revoked" by operation of law. And in this context
the burden is exacerbated by the choice-of-law problem that may con-
front an administrator when the employer is located in one State, the
plan participant lives in another, and the participant's former spouse in
a third.
Id. at 148-49. "Differing state regulation affecting ERISA plan's 'system for
processing claims and paying benefits' impose 'precisely the burden that ERISA
preemption was to avoid.'" Id. at 150 (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,
482 U.S. 1, 10 (1987)). Eglehoff decided that ERISA preempted a state law void-
ing beneficiary designations upon divorce. Nevertheless, for states' statutes of
limitations, the federal circuit courts relish reveling in choice of law rules for
ERISA. See supra notes 82, 94, 137 and accompanying text.
177. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 379 (2002) ("Any such
provision [by state law adding remedies to ERISA] patently violates ERISA's pol-
icy of inducing employers to offer benefits by assuring predictable set of liabili-
ties, under uniform standards of primary conduct and a uniform regime of
ultimate remedial orders and awards when a violation has occurred."). Moran
found an independent review of an HMO decision not preempted by ERISA due to
the insurance exception.
178. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1993).
179. See In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983) (Williams, J.). Justice Williams was
the author's professional responsibility professor in law school. Consequently,
the author has a suspicion that Justice William's dislike for doctors influenced
his erroneous decision, which prevented a doctor from shielding his assets from
creditors by contributing them to a retirement plan.
180. See, e.g., In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985) (following Goff, 706 F.2d
574); In re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488 (lth Cir. 1985) (following Goff, 706 F.2d
574); In re Graham, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984) (following Goff, 706 F.2d 574).
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an anti-alienation provision,181 constituted a spendthrift trust, the
plan administrator had to use state spendthrift law. State spendthrift
trust law varied significantly, especially for self-settled trusts and
loans taken from retirement plans. 182 Consequently, under the Fifth
Circuit decision, an interstate ERISA plan could be a spendthrift trust
in some states, and not a spendthrift trust in other states. The Su-
preme Court eventually ended this lunacylS3 in 1992.184
3. The Mandate for Trust Law
Even if one accepted that state statutes of limitations should gov-
ern, ERISA's legislative history, as interpreted by the Supreme Court,
suggests that, for the benefits due lawsuit and the employer retalia-
tory discrimination lawsuit, the appropriate body of law comes from
trust law, not contract law. Congressional reports indicate that ER-
ISA grafted fiduciary principles onto employee benefit plans that Con-
gress took from traditional trust law.185 Consequently, when
reviewing fiduciary behavior, in particular a plan administrator's in-
terpretation of plan terms when the plan grants interpretative discre-
tion to the plan administrator, the Supreme Court seized the trust law
rule, namely the abuse of discretion standard based on uniform fed-
eral application and not on each state's interpretation.18 6 The federal
circuit courts continue to use this trust law abuse of discretion stan-
dard to review plan interpretations in connection with the denial of
plan benefits under the benefits due lawsuit. 18 7
181. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 206(d)(1), 29
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2000); 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (2002).
182. See Flint, supra note 17, at 470-73 (noting that some states don't recognize
spendthrift trusts, while others exclude those trusts that permit loans or hard-
ship distributions).
183. The author as in-house legal counsel for Exxon Corporation's interstate retire-
ment plans routinely advised the Exxon plans to refuse to turn over plan assets
to bankruptcy trustees, based on the anti-alienation provision being a spendthrift
trust provision, before the Goff decision.
184. See Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
185. See S. REP. No. 93-127, at 29-30 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838,
4865-66 ("The fiduciary responsibility section, in essence, codifies and makes ap-
plicable to these fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the
law of trusts .... [The act] incorporate[s] the core principles of fiduciary conduct
as adopted from existing trust law, but with modifications appropriate for em-
ployee benefit plans."); see also H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 12-13 (1974), reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4650-51. See generally George Lee Flint, Jr. & Philip
W. Moore, Jr., ERISA: A Co-Fiduciary has no Right to Contribution and Indem-
nity, 48 S.D. L. REV. 7, 29-33 (2003).
186. See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989).
187. See, e.g., Allison v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 381 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 2004)
(involving abuse of discretion, labeled arbitrary and capricious, rule for plan in-
terpretation for the benefits due lawsuit); Glista v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
378 F.3d 112 (1st Cir. 2004) (same); Verden v. Alexander & Alexander Inc., 379
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The trust plan interpretation rule is not the only trust law rule
adopted by the federal circuit courts for ERISA actions. Similarly, the
federal circuit courts have determined that the remedy sought for both
the benefits due lawsuit and the employer retaliatory discrimination
lawsuit is trust-like, and hence equitable. Consequently, when the
participant requests a jury trial for the benefits due lawsuitl88 or the
employer retaliatory discrimination lawsuit,1 8 9 the district court de-
nies the request since the action is trust-like.
So according to the federal circuit courts, for plan interpretation
and for jury trial, an employee benefit plan is a trust, but for the limi-
tations period, an employee benefit plan is a contract. For consis-
tency, these courts should have used the state trust statute of
limitations. But like the contract rule, this rule also does not yield a
uniform limitations period. States have varying statutes of limita-
tions for trust matters. 190
The circuit courts have avoided using state statutes of limitations
for trusts, since state statutes seldom contain a specific limitation for
trust causes of action. The reason is that the statutes of limitations
F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 2004) (involving abuse of discretion rule for plan interpretation
for the benefits due lawsuit). See generally Flint, supra note 13, at 1027-46.
188. See, e.g., Adams v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., 149 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 1998);
Bittinger v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 123 F.3d 877 (6th Cir. 1997); DeFelice v. Am.
Int'l Life Assurance Co. of N.Y., 112 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Coburn v.
Cont'l Cas. Co., 306 F. Supp. 2d 815 (N.D. Ind. 2003). See generally Flint, supra
note 14, at 361.
189. See, e.g., Spinelli v. Gaughan, 12 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating ERISA
only provides equitable remedy); Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 894 F.2d 647, 649
(3d Cir. 1990); Howard v. Parisian, Inc., 807 F.2d 1560, 1566-67 (11th Cir. 1987);
see also Vargas v. Child Dev. Council of Franklin County, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 2d
954 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
190. Compare TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.051 (Vernon 1997) (creating
four-year limitations period for action for which there is no express limitation
period, except an action to recover realty), and Greman v. Forgeron, 101 S.W.2d
885, 888 (Tex. App. 1937) (disregarding four-year limitations period lawsuits in-
volving withholding of real or personal property), with Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 413.120(5) (Banks-Baldwin 2003) (creating five-year limitations period for law-
suits involving withholding of real or personal property), and Potter v. Conn.
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 361 S.W.2d 515, 516 (Ky. 1962) (applying statutory five-year
limitations period to bar recovery under an alleged trust agreement). Also com-
pare TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004(a)(5) (Vernon 1997) (creating
four-year limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty), and Jones v. Stub-
beman, McRae, Sealy, Laughlin & Browder, Inc., 2002 W.L. 595043 (Tex. App.
2002) (applying statutory four-year limitations period to bar recovery for breach
of fiduciary duty in a trust dispute), with LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3499 (West
2005) (creating a ten-year limitations period for personal actions unless other-
wise provided by the legislature), and Edwins v. Lilly, 422 So. 2d 1217, 1223 (La.
Ct. App. 1982) (applying ten-year limitations period instead of one-year period
created for tort actions).
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originally covered only legal actions, not equity.' 91 Now many juris-
dictions apply statutes of limitations to actions to enforce trusts, ei-
ther through express statutes of limitations192 or through the state's
residual statute of limitations for which there is no express statute of
limitations.193
B. The Correct Rule
Justice Stewart overstated his case in favor the state statutes of
limitations for LMRA actions. 19 4 In Hoosier Cardinal Corp., Justice
White, the former great running back, did not so fumble the issue. In
his dissent, Justice White noted that the real issue is what federal
policy required. 19 5 Courts, in fashioning federal common law to fill
congressional gaps, may only resort to state law if that state law sup-
plements and fulfills federal policy. 19 6 In prior LMRA cases, the Su-
191. See, e.g., 21 Jam., c. 16 (1623), reprinted in 4 GREAT BRITAIN, STATUTES OF THE
REALM 1222-23 (1963). See generally GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAY-
LOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 950, at 611 (rev. 2d ed. 1995).
192. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-27 (1982) (creating ten year statute of limitations);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.05 (West 2000) (creating six year statute of limitations);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-39 (1999) (creating ten year statute of limitations). See
generally BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 191, § 950, at 612.
193. See, e.g., Walters v. Lewis, 634 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1982) (holding that five-year
limit under section 37-213 of the Arkansas Code, current version at ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-56-115 (Michie 1987), had not expired because of fraud in administra-
tion of the estate); Nayee v. Nayee, 705 So. 2d 961 (Fla. App. 1998) (refusing to
apply four-year statute of limitations under section 95.11 of the Florida Statutes
without a factual determination that family trust beneficiaries had knowledge of
trustees adverse possession or repudiation of trust assets); In re Cmty. Serv. Soc.
of N.Y., 686 N.Y.S.2d 46 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (applying six-year limitations pe-
riod under section 213 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules to bar action
against a trust); Mason v. Taft, 50 A. 648 (R.I. 1901) (discussing whether limita-
tions period under chapter 234, section 3 of the Rhode Island Laws, current ver-
sion at R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-1-13(a) (1997), applies in an action against a trust); In
re S. Int'l Co., 165 B.R. 815 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994) (disregarding five-year limita-
tions period for property damage suit under section 8.01-243 of the Virginia Code
and instead applying general one-year limitations period under section 8.01-248).
See generally BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 191, § 950, at 618.
194. See supra notes 160-68 and accompanying text.
195. Int'l Union, UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 709 (1966) (White, J.,
dissenting, joined by Douglas, J. and Brennan, J.).
196. Id.; see also Ass'n of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Corp.,
348 U.S. 437, 463 (1955) (Reed, J. concurring) (justifying the use of state law to
resolve a discrepancy in the LMRA); Homberg v. Ambrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 394-95
(1946) (using state law to determine the limitations period under section 16 of the
Federal Farm Loan Act); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343,
352-53 (1939) (recognizing influence of local law when interpreting the Indian
General Allotment Act of 1887, commonly called the Dawes Act).
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preme Court had followed this procedure. 19 7 So the congressional
silence did not mean that Congress intended to apply state law.198
Justice White then supported his conclusion that state law would not
work for LMRA limitations periods. He noted that using state stat-
utes of limitations meant that far more than fifty statutes of limita-
tions would be applicable to LMRA section 301 actions, depending on
the type of lawsuit under LMRA section 301. He noted further that
some states provided multiple statutes of limitations for one particu-
lar type of action, for example, contracts, depending on whether they
were written.19 9 Therefore, for the interstate employee benefit plan,
an employee in one state could recover on an action barred for a simi-
larly situated employee in another state.2 00 He felt that simple justice
mandated that the assertion of federal causes of action by employees
in different states should be equally available. 20 1 Nor should plan ad-
ministrators have to refer to more than fifty statutes of limitations for
similarly situated employees, nor be concerned about claims of em-
ployees in one state already barred for other similarly situated em-
ployees in another state.2 0 2 The fertile minds of lawyers would find
other opportunities for vexatious litigation over choice of law rules,
choice of state statute of limitations, and other intricacies that Con-
gress did not intend.2 03 A uniform rule would eliminate this
litigation. 204
Subsequent litigation in the Supreme Court over limitations peri-
ods for federal causes of action follows Justice White. Since the Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins2 05 opinion reversed the blind use of state
law as federal common law, the Supreme Court has not held that the
Judicial Act requires state law to fill congressional statute of limita-
tions gaps in federal statutes. 20 6 In some instances state statutes of
limitations are so unsatisfactory that it is inappropriate for a court to
assume Congress would adopt state statutes of limitations at odds
with the purpose of the federal legislation. 2 07 In these instances,
197. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. at 710 (citing Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957) (applying federal common law for enforce-
ment of arbitration of collective bargaining agreement under LMRA)).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 709.
200. Id. at 711-12.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 712.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
206. See DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 159 n.13 (1983).
207. See id. at 161; see also United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 68 n.4
(1981) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that the assumption Congress held was
that states' statutes of limitations works best for express actions, not implied
ones); Int'l Union, UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 706 (1966) (stat-
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rules drawn for federal law, either express federal statutes of limita-
tions or federal doctrines of laches, serve as sources of law to fill the
congressional gaps. 2 08 So, although many Supreme Court opinions
still cite the basic rule that state law determines the statute of limita-
tions for federal causes of action where Congress has specified no stat-
ute of limitations,209 the Supreme Court also has recognized
exceptions. 2 10 One of these exceptions involved the LMRA. The Su-
preme Court limited the Hoosier Cardinal Corp. opinion to a cause of
action by the union, not an employee, and only for a breach of contract
action for the collective bargaining agreement. 21 1 Unfortunately, the
federal circuit courts have not noticed this reservation for other rules,
possibly federal, for a benefits due lawsuit under the LMRA.212 The
one LMRA exception recognized by the Supreme Court uses the six-
month federal statute of limitations for unfair labor practices before
the NRLB.213 The three-year New York statute of limitations for legal
malpractice actions is inappropriate for an employee action against
ing that there is no reason to reject state law, unless it is unreasonable or other-
wise inconsistent with national labor policy); id. at 709 (White, J., dissenting)
(stating that states' statutes of limitations are allowed only because they supple-
ment or fulfill federal policy); Ass'n of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 463 (1955) (Reed, J., concurring) (stating that
state law applies to LMRA section 301 actions only because it is not contrary to
federal policy but supplements and fulfills it).
208. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 162.
209. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
210. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 147-51
(1987) (using four-year limitations period under the Clayton Anti-Trust Act, 15
U.S.C. § 15b (1997), for assessing treble damages under the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1984), because state law pro-
vided no analogous source of law); Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432
U.S. 355, 367 (1977) (refusing to use state statute of limitations for the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)(1) (1994), since they conflict with the
delay for EEOC administrative procedures, so not subject to a statute of limita-
tions); McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 224 (1958) (using the
three-year statute of limitations of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (Supp.
2004), which uses the Federal Employee's Liability Act limitations, 45 U.S.C.
§ 56 (1986), not state statutes of limitations, for admiralty unseaworthiness
causes of action joined with the Jones Act); Homberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392
(1946) (using federal doctrines of laches for equitable remedies, not state statute
of limitations by analogy under the Federal Farm Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. § 812
(1989)); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351 (1939) (states'
statutes of limitations do not apply to suits by the federal government unless it
waived sovereignty).
211. See Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. at 705 n.7.
212. See supra notes 41-67 and accompanying text.
213. See National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, ch. 372, § 10, 49 Stat. 449, 453
(1936), as amended by Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), ch.
120, § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 146 (1948); 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1998).
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the employer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement and
the union for breach of the duty of fair representation. 2 1 4
In Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,2 15 the Supreme
Court delineated the process for determining the appropriate limita-
tions period when Congress fails to specify one in the federal statute.
Unfortunately for ERISA, no federal circuit court has come close to
this procedure. First, the court must determine whether the federal
statute demands a uniform limitations period. 2 16 One such instance
is where the federal cause of action envisions so many diverse topics
that a single state statute of limitations would not fit all the diverse
topics. 2 17 ERISA contains considerable language in support of uni-
form administration of plans. 2 18 Due to this step, the Supreme Court
ultimately has used a federal statute of limitations 2 19 or specified the
uniform characterization under state law.2 20 Second, if the federal
statute requires uniformity, then the court must determine whether it
should derive the uniform limitations period from federal or state law.
ERISA contains a broad preemption provision.2 2 1 One of the factors
for this determination is whether the possibility of multiple state stat-
utes of limitations will present a danger of forum shopping. 2 2 2 The
Supreme Court has noted a potential for forum shopping under ER-
ISA if the ERISA rules vary from circuit to circuit. 22 3 Third, if the
federal statute requires a federal statute of limitations, then the court
must determine whether the federal statute of limitations affords a
closer fit with the cause of action than does the available state statute
214. See DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 168-70 (1983) (stating
that a long state statute of limitations for contracts is inappropriate since federal
policy demands rapid resolution of disputes and breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation is an unfair labor practice according to the NRLB).
215. 501 U.S. 350 (1991). Lampfdealt with the limitations period for the implied pri-
vate cause of action under Securities and Exchange Commission's rule 10b-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003), under the Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1997).
The Court decided in favor of the federal statute of limitations contained within
the Exchange Act for the express actions prohibiting misleading statements. See
15 U.S.C. § 78r(c) (1997) (no later than one year after discovery, but in no event
more than three years). Congress changed this rule to prohibit the retroactive
use of Lampf. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236, 2387 (1992) (amending 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa-l(a) (1994)). Congress also changed the rule to make it a two-year/five-
year limitations period. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
116 Stat. 745, 801 (2003) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (1994)).
216. See Lampf 501 U.S. at 357.
217. Id.
218. See supra notes 160-84 and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143
(1987).
220. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
221. See supra notes 169-84 and accompanying text.
222. See Lampf, 501 U.S. at 357.
223. See Mason v. Cont'l Group, Inc., 474 U.S. 1087 (1987) (White, J., dissenting).
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of limitations.2 24 Among the factors to aid this decision are the com-
monality of purposes and similarity of the elements.225 The ERISA
causes of action reflect the fiduciary duties imposed by Congress on
employee benefit plans, while state causes of action generally do not.
The Supreme Court has shed some additional light on this closer
analogy requirement. A court uses federal law for interstitial law-
making when federal policies are at stake and the practicalities of the
litigation make that federal rule significantly more appropriate. 2 26
Justice Scalia believes the "closer analogy" and "significantly more ap-
propriate" tests are unworkable. 22 7 "Closer analogy," if followed,
would not yield a uniform rule, but rather the federal rule in some
states and the state rule in others.228 "Significantly more appropri-
ate" is always satisfied since a uniform national limit for a federal
cause of action is always more appropriate than non-uniform state
rules.229 Examination of the Supreme Court's cases resulting in a
federal statute of limitations reveals causes of action dealing with hy-
brid situations, such as collective bargaining agreements with fair
representation 23 0 or seaworthiness with negligence, 23 1 or a statute
patterned after another federal statute.232 ERISA causes of action re-
semble the hybrid situation, part contract and part trust, so much so
the circuit courts flip-flop between contract law and trust law in their
treatment of employee benefit plans.2 3 3
IV. THE SOLUTION
There are three approaches to determine the correct limitations pe-
riod for the ERISA lawsuits not involving plan recovery for fiduciary
breaches. First, a court could determine that Congress did in fact pro-
vide a statute of limitations rather than conclude, as the federal cir-
cuit courts have to date, that Congress failed to specify a statute of
limitations. Second is to use the Supreme Court's methodology. Third
is for the plan to specify a contractual limitations period.
224. See Lampf, 501 U.S. at 357.
225. See id. at 358.
226. See N. Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 35 (1995); Reed v. United Transp.
Union, 488 U.S. 319, 324 (1989); DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S.
151, 161 (1983).
227. See N. Star Steel Co., 515 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting use of an
infinite limitations period rather than the most analogous state statute of
limitations).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See, e.g., DelCostello, 462 U.S. 151.
231. See, e.g., McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958).
232. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
233. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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There are five different types of ERISA lawsuits of interest for
which the circuit courts presently use state statutes of limitations.23 4
Participant-beneficiaries may sue: (1) for penalties for failure to pro-
vide information when requested; 2 35 (2) for benefits due; 2 3 6 (3) for in-
junctive and other equitable relief for violations or enforcement of
plan provisions;237 (4) for injunctive and other equitable relief for vio-
lations or enforcement of ERISA's fiduciary provisions; 2 38 and (5) for
injunctive and other equitable relief for violations or enforcement of
ERISA's provisions other than the fiduciary provisions. 2 39
A. The Congressional Specification of a Statute of
Limitations
The myth that ERISA does not contain a statute of limitations for
ERISA lawsuits not involving plan recovery for damages arising from
a fiduciary duty breach 24o is based on two assumptions. First, ER-
ISA's statute of limitations for fiduciary duty breaches applies only to
ERISA actions under ERISA section 409.241 Second, lawsuits for fidu-
ciary duty breaches can only be brought under ERISA section
502(a)(2). ERISA section 502(a)(2) provides that "[a] civil action may
be brought by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduci-
ary for appropriate relief under section [4091 of this title."242 The ref-
erence to ERISA section 409 merely provides the plan with a recovery
for fiduciary duty breaches in which the plan sustains a loss:
234. Participant-beneficiaries may additionally sue for relief concerning certain IRS
notices and insurance contracts upon termination. See Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974 § 502(a)(4)-(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(4)-(5) (2000). The
circuit courts have no decisions concerning statutes of limitations for these law-
suits. Participant-beneficiaries, as well as fiduciaries, may also sue for plan re-
coveries for breach of fiduciary duty under sections 409 and 502(a)(2), to which
the ERISA statute of limitations, section 413, applies. See Employee Retirement
Income Security Act §§ 409, 413, 502(a)(2).
235. See id. §§ 502(a)(1)(A), 502(c).
236. See id. § 502(a)(1)(B).
237. See id. § 502(a)(3). Fiduciaries may also sue for this remedy, such as the subse-
quently disallowed recovery for benefits paid.
238. See id. Fiduciaries may also sue for this remedy.
239. See id. Fiduciaries may also sue for this remedy, such as the lawsuit for em-
ployer retaliatory discrimination under ERISA section 510 and for delinquent
employer contributions under ERISA section 515.
240. For the informational penalty lawsuit, see supra notes 37-40 and accompanying
text. For the benefits due lawsuit, see supra notes 41-67 and accompanying text.
For the equitable remedy for the enforcement of plan provisions lawsuit, see
supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text. For the employer retaliatory discrimi-
nation lawsuit, see supra notes 74-96 and accompanying text. For the delin-
quent employer contribution lawsuit, see supra notes 97-110 accompanying text.
241. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 409.
242. Id. § 502(a)(2).
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Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the
responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this sub-
chapter [Title I] shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses
to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any
profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the
plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial
relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary
243
The Supreme Court has confirmed that relief under ERISA sections
409 and 502(a)(2) is limited to recovery by the plan.2 44
Unfortunately for the federal circuit courts making these two as-
sumptions, nowhere did Congress limit the ERISA statute of limita-
tions for fiduciary duty breach to actions under ERISA section
502(a)(2). Instead, the ERISA fiduciary duty breach statute of limita-
tions says it applies to all actions under Title I, not just ERISA section
502(a)(2):
No action may be commenced under this subchapter [Title I-Protection of
Employee Benefit Rights] with respect to a fiduciary's breach of any responsi-
bility, duty, or obligation under this part [Part 4-Fiduciary Duty], or with
respect to a violation of this part, after the earlier of-
(1) six years after (A) the date of the last action which constituted a part of
the breach or violation, or (B) in the case of an omission, the latest date on
which the fiduciary could have cured the breach or violation, or
(2) three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowl-
edge of the breach or violation;
except that in the case of fraud or concealment, such action may be com-
menced not later than six years after the date of discovery of such breach or
violation. 2 4 5
To interpret the ERISA statute of limitations as limited to actions
under ERISA section 502(a)(2) would violate the Supreme Court's
statutory interpretation technique for word surplusage. 24 6 Moreover,
had Congress desired to limit the ERISA statute of limitations to ER-
ISA section 409 actions, it could have used such language. 2 47 In fact,
Congress did face early proposals to limit the ERISA statute of limita-
tions to actions for plan recoveries for fiduciary duty breaches. The
bill submitted to the House Education and Labor Committee on Janu-
ary 3, 1973, and the bill submitted to the Senate Finance Committee
243. Id. § 409.
244. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140-44 (1985).
245. Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 413.
246. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (stating that stat-
utory interpretation canons require a court to give effect to each work if possible,
unless inadvertently inserted or repugnant to the rest of the statute); see also
KARL LLEWELEYN, THE COMMON LAw TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 525 (1960).
247. See, e.g., Inter-Model Rail Employees Ass'n v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe
Ry., 520 U.S. 510, 515 (1997) ("Had Congress intended to confine § 510's protec-
tion to 'vested' rights, it could have easily substituted the term 'pension plan'...
for 'plan,' or the term 'non-forfeitable' right . . . for 'any right.'").
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as of August 21, 1973, both contained such a limit.2 48 In contrast, the
bill submitted to the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee on
January 4, 1973, applied the ERISA limitations period to all ERISA
actions. 249 The ultimate removal of the language limiting the limita-
tions period to plan recoveries clearly indicates that Congress in-
tended the ERISA statute of limitations to cover more than just the
action for plan recovery. 250 Consequently, the ERISA express statute
248. See H.R. 2, 93d Cong. § 111(i) (1973), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 154, at 46 ("No action may be commenced under subsection (d) [which pro-
vides for the plan recovery] with respect to a fiduciary's breach of any responsibil-
ity, duty, or obligation, or with respect to a violation of section 112 [providing a
prohibition against certain persons holding fiduciary offices], after the earlier of
(1) six years after the date of the breach or violation, or (2) three years after the
earliest date (A) on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or
violation, or (B) on which a report from which he could reasonably be expected to
have obtained knowledge of such breach or violation was filed with the Secretary
[of Labor] under this title."); see also S. 1179, 93d Cong. § 501(d)(15) (1973), re-
printed in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 154, at 955 ("No action, suit, or
proceeding based on a violation of subsection (b) [which provides for the plan re-
covery] or (c) [providing a prohibition against certain persons holding fiduciary
offices] shall be maintained unless it is commenced within 3 years after the filing
with the Secretary of a report, statement, or schedule with respect to any matter
disclosed by such report, statement, or schedule, or, with respect to any matter
not so disclosed, within 3 years after complainant otherwise has knows or has
reason to know of such violation, whichever is later, but no such action, suit or
proceeding shall be commenced more than 10 years after the violation occurred.
In the case of a willfully false or fraudulent statement or representation of a ma-
terial fact or the willful concealment of, or willful failure to disclose, any material
fact required to be disclosed to the Secretary, a proceeding in court may be
brought at any time within 10 years after such violation occurs."); S. REP. No. 93-
383, at 106, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 154, at 1174 ("If the
fiduciary breach is disclosed in a report filed with the Secretary of Labor, civil
action may be brought no later than 3 years after the report is filed. In other
cases, an action may be brought within 3 years after the plaintiff knows or has
reason to know of the violation, but no action may be brought more than 10 years
after the transaction occurred. Additionally, where there is a willfully false or
fraudulent statement, misrepresentation, concealment or failure to disclose a ma-
terial fact to the Secretary of Labor, action may be brought within 10 years of the
violation."). The House provision contains the essential parts of the enacted leg-
islation. Compare H.R. 2, supra, § 111(i), with Employment Retirement Income
Security Act § 413. The ERISA version of subpart (B) of H.R. 2 was deleted from
the current version of ERISA in 1987. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-71 (1989).
249. See S. 4, 93d Cong. § 608 (1973), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
154, at 186 ("Any action, suit, or proceeding based upon a violation of this Act or
the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act shall be commenced within five
years after the violation occurs. In the case of fraud or concealment, such action,
suit or proceeding shall be commenced within five years of the date of discovery of
such violation."); see also S. REP. No. 93-127, at 47 (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4883 ("[Section 608 of tihe bill provides a statute of limita-
tions of five years for actions arising under the act.").
250. See, e.g., Bindczyck v. Finucane, 342 U.S. 76, 83 (1951) (concluding that an
amendment to the original bill just before its passage indicated that Congress
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of limitations for fiduciary duty breach would apply to the other
causes of action under ERISA section 502, provided they seek to rem-
edy a breach of fiduciary duty.
These other causes of action provide recovery, among others, for
the employee, participant, and beneficiary. It would be strange indeed
for Congress to have claimed to provide these individuals with ex-
panded federal recovery 2 5 1 from added fiduciary duties2 5 2 and then
leave them out when they are damaged by breaches of those added
fiduciary duties. The failure to recognize remedies for fiduciary duty
breaches in these other causes of action produced this myth. ERISA
states:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interests of the participants and beneficiaries and
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in like capacity and familiar with
such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character
and with like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of
large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do
so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan
insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provi-
sions of this subchapter [ERISA, Title I, for protection of employee benefit
rights] and subchapter III [ERISA, Title IV, for plan termination insur-
ance] of this chapter.2 5 3
1. The Informational Penalty Lawsuit
Failure to provide information on request constitutes a breach of
fiduciary duty. Traditional trust law has long recognized the fiduciary
duty of the trustee to provide information at the beneficiary's re-
intended to change its meaning when it was passed as the Nationality Act of
1940); Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 458 n.2
(1937) ("Amendments to the bill subsequent to its introduction plainly demon-
strate careful intention to leave the lien wholly unimpaired."); Fed. Trade
Comm'n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1931) (discussing the significance
of a change of wording in the original bill to the Federal Trade Commission Act);
see also 2A NoRmAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.18
at 484-85 n.3 (6th ed. 2000).
251. See H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 17 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4655 ("The intent of the committee [in providing the benefits due lawsuit] is to
provide the full range of legal and equitable remedies available in both state and
federal courts to remove jurisdictional and procedural obstacles which in the past
appear to have hampered effective enforcement of fiduciary responsibilities
under state law for recovery of benefits due participants."); S. REP. No. 93-127, at
35, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4871.
252. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
253. Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 404(a)(1).
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quest.2 54 ERISA's legislative history indicates that Congress incorpo-
rated traditional trust law principles into ERISA, slightly modified to
account for differences between employee benefit plans designed for
many beneficiaries and testamentary trusts tailored for one or a few
beneficiaries. 25 5 The similarity between the structure of the penalty
remedy of ERISA section 502(a)(1)(A) and the trust law rule, requiring
a request, suggests the trust law rule as the source of the ERISA pro-
vision. Once the Supreme Court determined that ERISA provided an
individual participant-beneficiary with a remedy for a breach of fidu-
ciary duty,2 5 6 each circuit court determined257 that the fiduciary du-
ties of a plan administrator included providing information at the
reasonable request of the participant-beneficiary.25s The failure to
provide the requested information, if reasonable, breaches the pru-
dent person rule of ERISA's multitude of fiduciary duties.2 59 Al-
254. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 (1959) ("The Trustee is under a duty to
the beneficiary to give him upon his request at reasonable times complete and
accurate information as to the nature and amount of trust property, and to per-
mit him ... to inspect ... documents relating to the trust.").
255. S. REP. No. 93-127, at 29-30, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4865-66; H.R.
REP. No. 93-533, at 12-13, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4650-51; see
also Flint & Moore, supra note 185, at 30-31.
256. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996) (permitting recovery under
ERISA section 502(a)(3) for "appropriate equitable relief").
257. The Supreme Court had declined to rule on this matter. See id. at 506 (declining
to determine "whether ERISA fiduciaries have any fiduciary duty to disclose
truthful information ... in response to employee inquiries").
258. See Griggs v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 237 F.3d 371, 381 (4th Cir. 2001)
(breach for failure to correct disclosure of the absence of tax on rollover distribu-
tion); Bowerman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 226 F.3d 574, 589-91 (7th Cir. 2000)
(breach for failure to adequately disclose COBRA options); Krohn v. Huron Mem'l
Hosp., 173 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 1999) (breach for failure to provide adequate
information to request about entitlement to disability benefits); Estate of Becker
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 120 F.3d 5, 8-9 (2d Cir. 1997) (breach for failure to pro-
vide complete and correct information on options under retirement plan); Joyce v.
RJR Nabisco Holdings Corp., 126 F.3d 166, 172 (3d Cir. 1997) (breach for failure
to inform of eligibility for disability benefits even without request); Shea v. Esen-
stein, 107 F.3d 625, 628-29 (8th Cir. 1997) (breach for failure to disclose HMO's
incentive structure with respect to recommendation against specialist); Maez v.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel., Inc., 54 F.3d 1488, 1498-1501 (10th Cir. 1995)
(breach for failure to disclose information with respect to early retirement); Eddy
v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 747, 748-49 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (breach for failure
to disclose material information about participants status and options upon pol-
icy cancellation). But see Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 428 (5th
Cir. 2003) (no breach for failure to disclose contemplated plan changes); Watson
v. Deaconess Waltham Hosp., 298 F.3d 102, 114-15 (1st Cir. 2002) (no breach for
failure to inform return to part-time status precludes disability benefits); McLeod
v. Or. Lithoprint, Inc., 102 F.2d 376, 378 (9th Cir. 1996) (no damage recovery for
breach of failing to inform of eligibility for cancer coverage).
259. See, e.g., Eddy, 919 F.2d at 750; Bixler v. Cent. Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare
Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1299 (3d Cir. 1993).
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though the fiduciary duty extends beyond the request situation, 26 0 the
penalty remedy 26 1 of ERISA section 502(a)(1)(A) is limited to the re-
quest situation.26 2 If the fiduciary is liable under the penalty remedy,
it is solely because of a breach of the fiduciary's duty. Consequently,
ERISA's breach of fiduciary duty statute of limitations, ERISA section
413, should apply to this breach of fiduciary duty, not a state's most
analogous statute of limitations.263
2. The Benefits Due Lawsuit
For the benefits due lawsuit under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B), the
plan administrator, as fiduciary,26 4 has made a decision not to pay
benefits to the participant-beneficiary. If the decision is correct, there
is no fiduciary duty breach. But if the decision is wrong, the plan ad-
ministrator has not acted as a prudent person acting in like capacity
and familiar with such matters. The circuit courts recognize this prin-
ciple that the plan administrator's decision constitutes a fiduciary de-
cision.2 65 In other words, the decision to grant or not to grant a
benefit is a fiduciary decision. The Supreme Court has mandated that
a court's review of this decision is governed by fiduciary law, in partic-
260. Current litigation deals with extending the fiduciary duty to disclose beyond the
request and correction situations to require disclosure of material information
unknown to the participant-beneficiary. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 173 cmt. d (1959) ("[The trustee] is under a duty to communicate... material
facts affecting the interest of the beneficiary which [the trustee] knows the bene-
ficiary does not know and which the beneficiary needs to know for his protection
.... "). See generally Howard Shapiro & Robert Rachal, The Duty to Inform and
Fiduciary Breaches: The "New Frontier" in ERISA Litigation, 14 LAB. LAw. 503
(2002) (focusing primarily on contemplated plan amendments).
261. The ERISA penalty remedy is to punish the fiduciary, not to enable the partici-
pant-beneficiary to recover some damages. See, e.g., Scott v. Suncoast Beverage
Sales, Ltd., 295 F.3d 1223, 1232 (11th Cir. 2002); Daughtrey v. Honeywell, Inc., 3
F.3d 1488, 1494 n.11 (11th Cir. 1993).
262. See, e.g., Rego v. Westvaco Corp., 319 F.3d 140, 149 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding there
is no liability under ERISA § 502(c) absent a request); Bannistor v. Ullman, 287
F.3d 394, 407 (5th Cir. 2002) (same).
263. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
264. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(21)(A) (2000). A person is a fiduciary if he exercises any discretionary
authority or control with respect to the administration or management of the
plan or its assets. Id.
265. In order to receive a heightened review standard for a benefits due lawsuit under
various types of benefit plans, the participant-beneficiary must show (1) serious
procedural irregularity, and (2) that such irregularities caused a serious breach
of the trustee's fiduciary duty to the plan beneficiary. See, e.g., Neumann v. AT &
T Communications, Inc., 376 F.3d 773, 781-82 (8th Cir. 2004) (disability plan);
Buttram v. Cent. States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Health & Welfare Fund,
76 F.3d 896, 900-01 (8th Cir. 1996) (medical reimbursement plan); Atwood v.
Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317, 1322-23 (9th Cir. 1995) (severance pay plan).
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ular the abuse of discretion standard. 266 Consequently, a wrong deci-
sion with respect to benefits due is a breach of fiduciary duty.26 7 The
ERISA statute of limitations, ERISA section 413, should govern this
breach of fiduciary duty, not a state's most analogous contractual stat-
ute of limitations.268
3. The Equitable Remedy Lawsuit to Enforce Plan Provisions
The equitable remedy under ERISA section 502(a)(3) seeks reme-
dies for violations of: (1) the plan; (2) ERISA's fiduciary provisions;
and (3) ERISA's provisions other than the fiduciary provisions. Ordi-
narily, statutes of limitations deal with legal remedies rather than eq-
uitable remedies. 26 9 Instead, the concept for equity is laches. 2 70 The
Supreme Court, however, does use analogous state statutes of limita-
tions to provide the period for laches.271
The circuit courts have concluded that a breach of a plan provision
also is a breach of fiduciary duty.27 2 Among the multitude of ERISA
266. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110-11 (1989).
267. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996) (finding a remedy for breach
of fiduciary duty with respect to plan interpretation and payment of claims
outside of ERISA section 409, running to the participant-beneficiary under ER-
ISA section 502(a)(1)(B)); see also id. § 510 (rejecting the plan sponsor's claim
that ERISA section 409 covers all the liability for a fiduciary breach, and finding
recovery for fiduciary breaches running to the participant-beneficiary outside of
ERISA section 409 in ERISA section 502(a)(3) for equitable remedies). A few
members of the Supreme Court still believe that ERISA sections 409 and
502(a)(2) provide the exclusive remedy for breach of fiduciary duty. See id. § 520
(Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by O'Connor, J. and Scalia, J.) (concluding ERISA
section 502(a)(1)(B) does not create a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty,
but exclusively for contract rights).
268. See supra notes 43-62 and accompanying text.
269. See, e.g., In re Mushroom Transp. Co., 382 F.3d 325, 337-38 (3d Cir. 2004) (equi-
table bankruptcy turnover claim against agents holding assets due to an ERISA
plan for breaches of fiduciary duty); Teamsters & Employers Welfare Trust v.
Gorman Bros. Ready Mix, 283 F.3d 877, 880 (7th Cir. 2002) (ERISA suit for delin-
quent employer contributions).
270. See, e.g., Holmes v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 213 F.3d 124, 134 (3d
Cir. 2000) (using Pennsylvania law for breach of fiduciary duty, delay in paying
benefits); Wells v. U.S. Steel & Carnegie Pension Fund, Inc., 950 F.2d 1244, 1250
(6th Cir. 1991) (pension plan suit for recoupment); see also Costello v. United
States, 365 U.S. 265, 281 (1961) (involving the equitable concept of laches in de-
naturalization proceedings).
271. See, e.g., Mushroom Transp. Co., 382 F.3d at 335-36 (using most analogous state
statute of limitations); Teamsters & Employers Welfare Trust, 283 F.3d at 880;
Holmes, 213 F.3d at 134.
272. See, e.g., Delgrasso v. Spang & Co., 769 F.2d 928, 935 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding
employer-administrator breached fiduciary duty in adopting a plan with a rever-
sion clause contrary to anti-reversion provision in plan agreement with union);
Donovan v. Cunnigham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1468 (5th Cir. 1983). But see, e.g., Mc-
Nab v. Gen. Motors Corp., 162 F.3d 959, 961-62 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding employer
did not violate fiduciary duty by selecting employees for retirement incentive pro-
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fiduciary duties is the obligation to follow plan provisions to the extent
these provisions are consistent with ERISA.273 Failing to follow plan
provisions, provided they agree with ERISA, constitutes a breach of
fiduciary duty. So the ERISA statute of limitations, ERISA section
413, should supply the limitation period for these equitable remedy
lawsuits to enforce plan provisions.
For violation of ERISA's fiduciary provisions, a majority of the Su-
preme Court has concluded that the remedy sought by a partici-
pant-beneficiary is to rectify a fiduciary duty breach. 27 4
Consequently, the ERISA statute of limitations, ERISA section 413,
supplies the limitations period for these equitable actions to enforce
ERISA's fiduciary provisions.
B. Court Implication of a Limitations Period
The third type of lawsuit under ERISA section 502(a)(3) (violation
of an ERISA provision other than the fiduciary provisions) does not so
readily resolve into a breach of fiduciary duty. The two lawsuits of
this nature involving the limitations period that have reached the cir-
cuit courts deal with employers-the first for delinquent employer
contributions and the second for employer retaliatory discrimination.
Employers may or may not be fiduciaries with respect to these two
acts for the employee benefit plan.
1. The Employer as an ERISA Fiduciary
Before a court can impose fiduciary liability on an employer, 27 5
that employer must serve as a fiduciary to the employee benefit plan
with respect to the complained act.2 76 ERISA defines fiduciaries as
gram since plan provided early retirement was possible only if employer and em-
ployee agreed); Catarino v. Barry, 8 F.3d 878, 883 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding trustees
did not violate fiduciary duty by refusing to transfer assets in accordance with no
asset transfer rule contained in plan); Berger v. Edgewater Steel Co., 911 F.2d
911, 918-19 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding plan administrator did not violate fiduciary
duty by refusing severance benefits in accordance with employers eligibility deci-
sion since plan required them to accept the employers determination).
273. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
274. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 510 (1996) (finding a violation of the
statutory fiduciary section where plan administrator breached duty of loyalty to
act "solely in the interest of the participants" by deceiving participants in order to
reduce employer costs).
275. For ERISA, the term "employer" includes its agents. See Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 3(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5) (2000) ("The
term 'employer' means any person acting directly as an employer, or indirectly in
the interest of an employer in relation to an employee benefit plan . . ").
276. See, e.g., Beddall v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1998)
(holding that ERISA extends fiduciary liability to functional fiduciaries); 29
C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 at D-4 (2003) (stating that directors are liable to extent they
exercise fiduciary functions); id. at FR-16 (stating that functional fiduciaries are
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those who have discretion over the assets, investments, or administra-
tion of the employee benefit plan.2 7 7 ERISA also imposes duties on
employers, prohibiting them from engaging in prohibited transac-
tions, 278 using plan assets for their own benefit, 279 engaging in retali-
atory discrimination,280 requiring them to fund the plan,281 and
requiring them to appoint the named fiduciary. 282 However, the Su-
preme Court has recognized that employers do not serve as fiduciaries
to an employee benefit plan when solely engaging in settlor functions,
such as establishing, amending, or terminating employee benefit
plans. 28 3 In contrast, employers act as fiduciaries when they appoint
only liable to extent they perform the fiduciary function). See generally Frank P.
Vanderploeg, Role Playing Under ERISA: The Company as "Employer" and "Fi-
duciary," 9 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 259 (1997) (addressing predominately asset diver-
sions and misrepresentations).
277. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 3(21)(A) ("[A] person is a fiduci-
ary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary author-
ity or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any
authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he
renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with
respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or
responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary
responsibility in the administration of such plan.").
278. See id. §§ 3(14)(C) (including employers in the definition of "party-in-interest"),
406 (stating the prohibited transaction rule).
279. See id. § 403(c).
280. See id. §§ 510, 511 (criminalizing coercive interference).
281. See id. § 302(c)(11); I.R.C. § 412(c)(11) (2002).
282. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 402(a).
283. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 443-45 (1999) (holding that
amending a contributory defined benefit does not trigger ERISA's fiduciary provi-
sions); Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887-91 (1996) (holding that
amending a retirement plan does not trigger ERISA's fiduciary provisions);
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 505-06 (1996) (holding that amending or
terminating a welfare plan is not an act of plan "management" or "administra-
tion," but making misrepresentations about future benefits does violate a fiduci-
ary duty); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995) (noting
that adopting, amending, or terminating a welfare plan is not a fiduciary func-
tion). The circuit courts have followed this rule. See, e.g., Int'l Union, UAW v.
Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 148 (3d Cir. 1999); Izzarelli v. Rexene Prods.
Co., 24 F.3d 1506 (5th Cir. 1994); Musto v. Am. Gen. Corp., 861 F.2d 897, 912 (6th
Cir. 1988); Young v. Standard Oil, 849 F.2d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir. 1988); Anderson
v. John Morrel & Co., 830 F.2d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 1987); Curlia v. Ward Foods,
Inc., 804 F.2d 1418, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1986); Phillips v. Amoco Oil Co., 799 F.2d
1464, 1471 (11th Cir. 1986); Amato v. W. Union Int'l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402,
1416-17 (2d Cir. 1985). The circuit courts similarly find no fiduciary duty for
trustees in amending multiemployer plans. See, e.g., Walling v. Brady, 125 F.3d
114 (3d Cir. 1997); Fagan v. Nat'l Stabilization Agreement of Sheet Metal Indus.
Trust Fund, 60 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 1985). Nor do the courts find fiduciary duties
in designing spin-offs of plans during corporate restructuring. See, e.g., Sengpiel
v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 156 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 1998); Systems Council EM-3 v.
AT&T Corp., 159 F.3d 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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fiduciaries, 28 4 exercise de facto control over fiduciary functions, 28 5
and communicate plan information to employees. 28 6
With respect to employer retaliatory discrimination under ERISA
section 510, one circuit court suggested the discriminatory act consti-
tutes a breach of a fiduciary duty.28 7 This court, however, did not
point to any of ERISA's fiduciary provisions that the discriminatory
284. See, e.g., Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 133-35 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding liability
for appointing business associates as administrators); 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 at D-
4 (2003) (stating that, in appointing fiduciaries, directors exercise fiduciary du-
ties); see also Hickman v. Tosco Corp., 840 F.2d 564, 566-67 (8th Cir. 1988) (hold-
ing that an employer is a fiduciary in appointing members of the administrative
committee, but not in amending plan). Appointment of fiduciaries entails moni-
toring the appointees. See Leigh, 727 F.2d at 133-35; see also Batchelor v. Oak
Hills Med. Group, 870 F.2d 1446, 1449 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that the existence
of a fiduciary duty is grounded in the selection and retention of plan administra-
tors); Ed Miniot, Inc. v. Globe Life Ins. Group, Inc., 805 F.2d 732, 736 (7th Cir.
1986) (finding a fiduciary duty with the power to select and remove trust admin-
istrators); 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 at D-4 (2003) (stating that directors have a fidu-
ciary duty for appointment and retention of fiduciaries). ERISA imposes co-
fiduciary liability on fiduciaries if they participate knowingly or knowingly con-
ceal a breach of fiduciary duty, fail with respect to their own fiduciary duties and
thereby enable the co-fiduciary's breach of fiduciary duty, or knows that a breach
of fiduciary duty has occurred but fail to take steps to rectify the breach. See
Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 405(a).
285. See, e.g., Bannister v. Ullman, 287 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding a breach of
fiduciary duty when the employer failed to forward to the employee benefit plan
the employees' retirement and health insurance contributions made during two
months preceding bankruptcy); LoPresti v. Terwilliger, 126 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 1997)
(involving an employer who commingled corporate and retirement funds to pay
corporate creditors); Yeseta v. Baima, 837 F.2d 380, 385-86 (9th Cir. 1988) (find-
ing a fiduciary duty based on the exercise of control over plan funds); Sommers
Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit-Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enters., 793 F.2d
1456, 1460 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding that there is liability where an employer has
control over the trustee's decision to sell plan stock).
286. See, e.g., Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 502-03 (holding that trust law requires fiduci-
aries to exercise powers appropriate to carry out the trust's purposes and, for
ERISA, plan administrators must provide information, so employers in providing
this information and responding to participant inquiries are exercising fiduciary
functions); see also Employee Retirement Income Security Act §§ 102 (stating
that a summary plan description must be furnished to participants and benefi-
ciaries), 104(b)(1) (requiring administrators to provide a summary plan descrip-
tion within ninety days of entry, summary of material modifications and latest
annual report, both within 210 days after plan year-end), 105(a) (requiring that a
statement indicating the status of the benefit plan be furnished to participants
and beneficiaries upon request).
287. See Heath v. Varity Corp., 71 F.3d 256, 258 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[A] court should not
use section 510 and ERISA's other fiduciary obligations .... Section 510 is only
one manifestation of the fiduciary-duty side of the equation."). One commentator
believes the same. See Reginald B. Henderson, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitra-
tion Agreements and ERISA Fiduciary Claims: The Courts Unfortunately Declare
Them a Perfect Match, 26 Am. J. TmAL ADV. 27, 61 (2002); see also Martin v.
Fellon, 965 F.2d 660, 666-67 (8th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the argument that a fiduci-
ary duty was breached by a decision affecting the value of stock held by an em-
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act violated. Another circuit court indicated the discriminatory act re-
sembled a nineteenth century breach of fiduciary duty.288 However,
most circuit courts have determined that the discriminatory act re-
lates to a management decision, and so is not a fiduciary duty.28 9 Al-
though it is conceivable that the discriminatory act relates to a breach
of fiduciary duty, the usual discriminatory act most likely will relate
to a management decision concerning discipline of employees rather
than a decision relating to the administration or investment of an em-
ployee benefit plan.
The circuit courts have identified as a trustee's fiduciary duty the
obligation to see that contributions are paid, at least for the multiem-
ployer plan.290 Therefore, the lawsuit for delinquent contributions
under ERISA sections 502(a)(3)(B) and 515 involves the enforcement
of a fiduciary duty. However, as the ERISA statute of limitations re-
quires, the enforcement is against the plan trustee not of the em-
ployer. So, like the employer retaliatory discrimination lawsuit, it is
conceivable that the delinquency act relates to a breach of fiduciary
duty,29 1 as the usual delinquent contribution situation most likely
will relate to a management decision concerning allocation of funds
rather than a decision relating to the administration or investment of
an employee benefit plan.
ployee stock ownership plan, because the transaction was corporate and did not
involve investing or administration of the plan).
288. See Spinelli v. Gaughan, 12 F.3d 853, 856 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[W]e could analo-
gize section 510 to an equitable action for breach of fiduciary duty-since section
510 imposes duties on one person for someone else's benefit (here the employer
becomes obligated not to fire employees for an improper reason).").
289. See, e.g., Bodine v. Employers Cas. Co., 352 F.3d 245, 251-52 (5th Cir. 2003)
(holding that an employer's decision not to terminate employees precluding their
qualifying for early retirement benefits was a business decision, which did not
breach a fiduciary duty under section 404 of ERISA); Haberen v. Kaupp Vascular
Surgeons Ltd. Defined Benefit Pension Plan, 24 F.3d 1491, 1497-98 (3d Cir.
1994) (holding that an employer's redesignation of employee's salary as a bonus
to prevent it from being taken into account in pension formula was a business
decision, which did not breach a fiduciary duty under ERISA section 510); see
also Hickman, 840 F.2d at 566-67 (holding that the employer fiduciary that ap-
pointed the plan administrator did not breach a fiduciary duty under section 404
of ERISA by not keeping employees on payroll long enough to qualify for early
retirement).
290. See, e.g., Best v. Cyrus, 310 F.3d 932, 935 (6th Cir. 2002); Moriarity v. Svec, 164
F.3d 323, 329 (7th Cir. 1998); Diduck v. Koszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 874
F.2d 912, 918 (2d Cir. 1989).
291. See Bannister v. Ullman, 287 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that an employer's
failure to remit participant contributions before the company fails constitutes a
breach of a fiduciary duty because it has exercised discretion over assets of the
plan).
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2. The Implication of a Limitations Period
For these two actions, the court needs to imply a limitations period.
Much of what follows would also apply to the other ERISA lawsuits of
interest, if a court failed to notice they seek a remedy for breach of
fiduciary duty and consequently did not apply the ERISA statute of
limitations. The methodology, adopted in Lampf after the federal cir-
cuit courts first mandated state statutes of limitations for this impli-
cation, requires that a court find three circumstances.
First, the court must determine whether the federal statute de-
mands a uniform limitations period. This is the key factor that distin-
guishes a LMRA case from an ERISA case. The Supreme Court
determined in Hoosier Cardinal Corp. that the LMRA's requirements
for uniformity did not extend beyond the negotiation of the collective
bargaining agreement and, most definitely, did not extend to a lawsuit
for a subsequent breach of that collective bargaining agreement.2 92
The Supreme Court decided this way even when apprised of the inher-
ent unfairness of using state statutes of limitations for two similarly
situated plan participants in different states with different statutes of
limitations, one barred from recovery, the other not.2 93 In contrast,
ERISA abounds in an effort to rectify this unfairness and achieve uni-
formity. ERISA contains a preemption provision and a reticulated
remedy provision, the functions of which are to eliminate state causes
of action for ERISA maladies. 29 4 The Supreme Court has recognized
that the ERISA uniformity requirement extends to the administration
of plans, procedural matters in ERISA lawsuits, and to remedial or-
ders and rewards. 2 95 Consequently, ERISA's mandate for uniformity
extends far beyond negotiating the plan and reaches procedural as-
pects of the various ERISA lawsuits and their remedies.
Second, since ERISA requires a uniform statute of limitations, the
court must determine whether a court should derive the uniform stat-
ute of limitations from federal or state law. ERISA contains a broad
preemption provision eradicating state law in so far as it affects ER-
ISA plans.2 9 6 With respect to this preemption provision, the Act's
sponsors all advocated the courts to develop federal common law for
ERISA plans.2 9 7
Ultimately, the Supreme Court is concerned with forum shop-
ping.2 98 The Court, in an earlier case, noted that, for an LMRA plan
under the state statute of limitations rule, forum shopping might arise
292. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 169-77 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
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for employees seeking benefits.2 99 The potential for forum shopping
for ERISA causes of action derives from the statute itself. As federal
causes of action, the parties may bring the ERISA action in any dis-
trict court of the United States where the plan is administered, where
the breach took place, or where the defendant resides or may be found,
with process of service in the district where the defendant resides or
may be found.300 This ERISA rule could easily provide jurisdiction in
several different states, especially for fiduciary duty breaches with an
interstate employee benefit plan involving several participants living
in different states. This is the reason ERISA uniformity extends be-
yond the LMRA's negotiation and administration to the ERISA reme-
dies and awards. 301
Justice White once noticed that even differing federal rules in the
circuits causes forum shopping. 30 2 The federal circuit courts have ac-
tually experienced parties engaging in forum shopping for ERISA.303
These experiences have specifically involved the state statute of limi-
tations.3 04 Despite the federal policy against forum shopping, the cir-
cuit courts have developed a standard for denying a change of venue
but giving the plaintiff great deference in selecting the forum.3 05
Even if the circuit courts could settle on one state's law as the source
of the uniform law, the various statutes of limitations in one state for
299. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
300. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 502(e)(2), (f), 29
U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2), (f) (2000).
301. See, e.g., Snow v. Aetna Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 852, 856 (W.D. Tenn. 1998)
('[Ultilization of the federal rate promotes uniformity in cases brought under ER-
ISA and discourages forum shopping.").
302. See Mason v. Cont'l Group, Inc., 474 U.S. 1087, 1087 (1986) (White, J., dissent-
ing) (disagreeing with the Court's denial of certiorari in an ERISA case due to
potential for forum shopping on the basis of different exhaustion of remedies
rules in the circuit courts).
303. See, e.g., NGS Am., Inc. v. Jefferson, 218 F.3d 519, 521-23 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting
plan administrator's forum shopping in bringing action in Michigan for declara-
tory relief to preempt Florida state court action by participant).
304. See, e.g., Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 960 F.2d 1168, 1179 (3d Cir. 1992) (refusing to
apply Michigan statute of limitations to an ERISA action by Michigan residents
brought in Pennsylvania despite a policy to discourage forum shopping among
states with different limitations); see also In re Masters Mates & Pilots Pension
Plan & IRAP Litig., 957 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1992) (refusing to use state law
for ERISA indemnification as it would lead to forum shopping); Held v. Mfrs.
Hanover Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197, 1202-03 (10th Cir. 1990) (adopting a
choice of law rule other than the forum state to select the most analogous state
statute of limitations to reduce forum shopping).
305. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 105 F.3d 1288, 1302 (9th Cir. 1997)
(listing the factors a court must consider for transferring venue: "(1) the relative
convenience of the selected forum and the proposed forum; (2) the possible hard-
ship to the plaintiff if the court grants the motion; (3) the interests ofjustice; and
(4) the deference to be accorded the plaintiffs' [sic] choice of forum"), rev'd on
other grounds, 525 U.S. 432 (1999) (reversing dismissal for failure to state an
ERISA claim after transfer of venue).
2005]
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even one area of law show no degree of uniformity.30 6 Since state law
cannot provide a uniform rule, federal law must be the source of the
uniform rule.
Congress has also considered this same problem for other federal
statutes. Commentators and courts had called upon Congress to elim-
inate the problems of forum shopping, which consumes judges' time
without advancing justice, in connection with the most analogous
state statute of limitations rule by enacting a federal limitations pe-
riod for all federal causes of action.30 7 Congress eventually created a
Federal Courts Study Committee, which recommended a retroactive
uniform federal statute of limitations.308 Congress acknowledged the
problems associated with the most analogous state statute of limita-
tions rule, such as the determination of which state's law applies
under various choice of law rules, the incentive for litigants to forum
shop caused by varying results among the circuit courts, and the dis-
ruption to the development of federal common law.30 9 In 1990 Con-
gress followed the Committee's recommendations, except for the
retroactive feature. 3 10 Congress failed to extend the act retroactively,
to such statutes as ERISA, believing that law was well-settled for
some of these federal statutes.3 1 1 Clearly, such is not yet the case for
ERISA.312
Third, since ERISA requires a federal statute of limitations, the
court must determine whether the chosen federal statute of limita-
tions affords a closer fit with the cause of action than does the availa-
ble state statutes of limitations. The concern of the Supreme Court's
methodology is the commonality of purposes and similarity of the ele-
ments of the causes of action, both between the statute missing the
limitations period and the chosen federal statute, as opposed to the
available state statutes. 3 13 There exist two obvious applicable federal
statutes of limitations, the ERISA statute of limitations for fiduciary
306. See supra notes 49-50, 56-57 and accompanying text.
307. See Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 379-80 (2004); Sentry
Corp. v. Harris, 802 F.2d 229, 246 (7th Cir. 1986); Mitchell A. Lowenthal et al.,
Time Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal Rights of Action and
State Statutes of Limitations, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1011, 1105 (1980).
308. See Jones, 541 U.S. at 380.
309. See H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 24 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860,
6870.
310. See 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (1994) (providing the statute of limitations for congressional
statutes enacted after December 1, 1990); see also Jones, 541 U.S. at 380-81 (ex-
tending the congressional rule to those statutes with causes of action amended
after December 1, 1990).
311. See H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 24, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6870.
312. See supra section II.A.
313. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
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duty breaches 3 14 and the federal residual statute of limitations.3 15 As
to the commonality of purposes, there can be no better statute of limi-
tations than the ERISA statute of limitations. Congress obviously in-
cluded it in ERISA since its purpose facilitated ERISA's aims. 3 16 As
to any competing analogous state remedy limitations, as far as em-
ployee plans are concerned, state law was a hindrance to participant
remedies. 3 1 7 This was the reason for replacing state law with the re-
ticulated ERISA remedies. 3 18 No state law has as its purpose the pro-
tection of moneys in, and rights derived from, employee benefit
plans. 3 19
As to the similarity of the elements of the causes of action, the ele-
ments of the employer retaliatory discrimination lawsuit and the de-
linquent employer contribution lawsuit resemble the ERISA fiduciary
breach lawsuit. The only difference is that the violated ERISA provi-
sion is not the fiduciary duty breach section,3 20 but the section prohib-
iting employer retaliatory discrimination 32 1 or the section requiring
payment of the employer contributions in accordance with multiem-
ployer plans or collective bargaining agreements. 3 22 The other ele-
ments are identical. No competing analogous state cause of action can
come close, since, due to ERISA preemption,3 23 state law cannot relate
to employee benefit plans.3 24 The elements of an ERISA cause of ac-
314. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 413, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1113 (2000).
315. 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (1994).
316. This comports with Justice Scalia's remarks about this test. See supra notes
227-29 and accompanying text. The one situation, not present for ERISA, when
this test is not so easily met is when the analogous federal statute of limitations
comes from another federal statute. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-
Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987) (applying the limitations period of the
Clayton Act to a RICO action).
317. See George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Extracontractual Damages Mandated for Bene-
fit Claims Actions, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 611, 647-49 (1994) (providing the legislative
history for expanded federal remedies over state remedies).
318. See id.
319. See S. REP. No. 93-127, at 36 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4872
("[There is] evidence that in some plans a worker's pension rights or the expecta-
tions of those rights were interfered with by the use of economic sanctions or
violent reprisals. Although the instances of these occurrences are relatively
small in number, the Committee has concluded that safeguards are required to
preclude this type of abuse from being carried out and in order to completely se-
cure the rights and expectations brought into being by this landmark reform legis-
lation.") (emphasis added).
320. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 404(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a) (2000).
321. Id. § 510.
322. Id. § 515.
323. See id. § 514(a).
324. Cf Mackey v Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 829 (1988) ("[Sltate
laws which make 'reference to' ERISA plans are laws that 'relate to' those plans
within the meaning of [ERISA] § 514(a).").
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tion differ significantly from those of state law,3 2 5 so much so that the
circuit courts frequently cannot devolve on a uniform state action. 3 26
Furthermore, the employer retaliatory discrimination lawsuit com-
prises many different acts 32 7 and so relates to several analogous state
actions, not one. This explains the wide variety of most analogous
state statutes of limitations found by the circuit courts. 328 The Su-
preme Court once before required the use of a federal statute of limita-
tions when the circuit courts looked to the underlying predicate to the
offense under the most analogous state statute of limitations rule.3 29
The inability of state law to provide a most analogous statute of limi-
tations for the ERISA employer retaliatory discrimination lawsuit
means the federal ERISA statute of limitations clearly is the "signifi-
cantly more appropriate" statute of limitations.
These same principals apply to the other lawsuits of interest, even
in the event a court is unable to the see the fiduciary duty involved.
They all involve breaches of ERISA provisions or plan provisions, not
as a simple contract but rather as an altruistic instrument with stan-
dards above that of the marketplace, and hence parallel the ERISA
fiduciary duty breach action. The employee benefit plan is similar to
the hybrid situation, a contract with trust-like duties imposed on em-
ployers, administrators, and trustees. Consequently, the ERISA stat-
ute of limitations should govern virtually all the actions under ERISA
section 502.
325. See, e.g., Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 2002) (requiring the
plaintiff to replead case under ERISA section 502(a) instead of common law
breach of good faith and fair dealing and contract as originally pled, or case would
be dismissed); Denton v. First Nat'l Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1297 n.2 (5th Cir. 1985)
(noting that two trials were required because the parties were unaware at the
first trial that ERISA applied).
326. See supra section II.A.
327. See, e.g., Lessard v. Applied Risk Mgmt., 307 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2002) (excluding
employees on medical leave from automatic transfer to plan of successor);
Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1993) (involving termination
for whistleblowing); Tavoloni v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 984 F. Supp. 196
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (involving the use of salary reduction and harassment to reduce
retirement benefit), affd, 198 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 1999); Burditt v. Kerr-McGee
Chem. Corp., 982 F. Supp. 404 (N.D. Miss. 1997) (involving the misclassification
of employees as independent contractors and then as leased workers to avoid pay-
ing pension benefits); Pickering v. USX Corp., 809 F. Supp. 1501 (D. Utah 1992)
(involving the indefinite idling of the plant, disguised as a shutdown, to reduce
pension costs); Healy v. Axelrod Const. Co. Defined Benefit Pension Plan &
Trust, 787 F. Supp. 838 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (involving fraudulently inducing a retiree
to execute a waiver to prevent him from obtaining pension benefits).
328. See supra section II.A.
329. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff& Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 148 (1987)
(borrowing another federal statute's limitations period for a RICO action).
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C. The Plan Specified Period of Limitations
For those plan administrators desiring to avoid the potential for
litigation under the most analogous state statute of limitations, both
for the choice of law and the determination of the most analogous
state cause of action, and who are also impatient for the Supreme
Court to provide guidance to the circuit courts after almost thirty
years of inaction, there is a third option. That option involves a con-
tractually specified period of limitations. Justice White's dissent in
Hoosier Cardinal Corp. noted the possibility of providing for contrac-
tual limitations periods in the collective bargaining agreement as a
method to achieve a uniform limitations period for LMRA actions. 33 0
The parties to the contract could agree to a limitations period, thereby
providing uniformity for that plan.
The Supreme Court enforces contractual limitations periods unless
there is some state statute or public policy voiding the provision or the
provision is unreasonable. 3 3 1 The existence of an otherwise applicable
state statute of limitations does not preclude enforcement of the con-
tractual limitations period.332 The circuit courts have even suggested
that the absence of federal statutes of limitations for some federal
causes of action shows congressional willingness to accept reasonable
contractual limitations periods for those causes of action. 33 3 The pub-
lic policy embodied in statutes of limitations is the promptitude of liti-
gation, not the prohibition of the contractual limitations.334 ERISA
330. See Int'l Union, UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 711 & n.2. (1966)
(White, J., dissenting) (noting that for uniformity, federal law would have to de-
termine the validity of contractual limitation periods since state law varied with
respect to the enforceability of such provisions).
331. See Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 608 (1947)
(upholding limitations period in constitution of fraternal benefit society over
longer South Dakota statute of limitations).
332. See Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386, 390 (1868) (uphold-
ing insurance policy provision over longer state statute of limitations, as the pub-
lic policy behind statutes of limitation is to encourage prompt filing lawsuits, not
to prohibit contractual provisions); see also Thompson v. Phenix Ins. Co., 136 U.S.
287, 298 (1890) (holding that state statutes of limitations can also be lengthened
by contractual waiver).
333. See Cange v. Stotler & Co., 826 F.2d 581, 584 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Congress' silence
... shows its willingness to accept reasonable limitations periods rather than a
strong policy in favor of some particular limitations period. Because Congress did
not provide an express statute of limitations [for this] action, allowing parties to
contract for shorter limitations periods than that which would be borrowed from
state law is not contrary to public policy.").
334. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 180-82 (1964) (holding that Flor-
ida's prohibition on statutes of limitations periods shorter than five years voided
the contractual limitations period of the Illinois insurer since insurance contract
did not specify which law governed the contract); La. & W.R. Co. v. Gardiner, 273
U.S. 280, 282-84 (1927) (holding that a federal act prohibited shorter period than
two years from notice voided a contractual limitation of two years from ship-
ment). But see Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292
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contains no such prohibition. The Supreme Court has determined
that unreasonable contractual limitations are those so short as not to
allow sufficient time to discover the breach. 3 35 The circuit courts have
followed this rule for various federal statutes. 33 6
To accomplish the contractual limitations period, the plan's specifi-
cation of a limitations period needs to be express; a mere "governed by
the law of X state" is insufficient. 33 7 Consequently, a court should en-
force a contractual limitations period contained in the plan or employ-
ment contract for the multitude of ERISA causes of action, provided it
is sufficiently long enough to permit discovery of the facts underlying
the cause of action. Rather than risk that a court would find a partic-
ularly short period of limitation unreasonable, the plan could specify a
period of limitation loosely paralleling the three-year ERISA statute of
limitation. 338
V. CONCLUSION
The circuit courts have created a quagmire of litigation for the in-
terstate employee benefit plan. That quagmire involves the wasteful-
U.S. 143, 148-49 (1934) (upholding contractual limitations in face of state statute
voiding such provisions, since contract had no relation to forum state); Home Ins.
Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408-09 (1930).
335. See S. Express Co. v. Caldwell, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 264, 269-71 (1874) (holding
that a ninety-day limitations period for bills of lading was reasonable as it al-
lowed sufficient time to discover breach); see also Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v.
Harriman, 227 U.S. 657, 672 (1913) (same). Some state courts add that unrea-
sonable contractual limitations also include those created by undue influence.
See, e.g., Fageol Truck & Coach Co. v. Pac. Indem. Co., 117 P.2d 669, 671-72 (Cal.
1941); Kozemko v. Griffith Oil Co., 682 N.Y.S.2d 503, 505 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998);
see also B.H. Glenn, Validity of Contractual Time Period, Shorter Than Statute of
Limitations, for Bringing Action, 6 A.L.R.3d 1197, 1207 (1966).
336. See, e.g., Truck Components, Inc. v. Beatrice Co., 143 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir.
1998) (involving the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act); In re VMS Ltd. P'ship Sec. Litig., 26 F.3d 50, 51 (7th Cir. 1994)
(involving an arbitration agreement under the Exchange Act); Cange, 826 F.2d at
584 (involving the Commodity Exchange Act); Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. United
States, 11 Cl. Ct. 150, 153 (1986) (involving the Interstate Commerce Act limita-
tions period); see also Gallegos v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 210 F.3d 803, 809-10
(7th Cir. 2000) (applying doctrine to ERISA exhaustion of remedies). For the ap-
plication to ERISA cases, see supra section II.B.
337. See, e.g., Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 960 F.2d 1168, 1179-80 (3d Cir. 1992); see also
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Peterson, 770 F.2d 141, 142 (10th Cir. 1985) (apply-
ing the federal six-year limitations period for contracts instead of the Illinois ten-
year period in an FDIC action to enforce a guarantee governed by Illinois law);
Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 637 F.2d 680, 682 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying the
Washington three-year limitations period instead of the British Columbia six-
year limitations period in a securities fraud case occurring prior to the decision in
Lampf).
338. See supra note 245 and accompanying text; see also Northlake Reg'l Med. Ctr. v.
Waffle House Sys. Employee Benefit Plan, 160 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 1998) (up-
holding a plan ninety-day period of limitation).
FUMBLING THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD
ness of litigating over choice of law rules and the subsequent most
analogous state statute of limitations rule. The circuit courts created
this quagmire by merely adopting the LMRA's most analogous state
statute of limitations rule as the ERISA rule, without considering ei-
ther congressional intent for ERISA or the Supreme Court's directives
with respect to the use of the most analogous state statute of limita-
tions rule.
The Supreme Court designed the LMRA rule, adopted in 1966,
based on congressional legislative history suggesting that the LMRA
lacked a need for uniformity in litigating employee benefit plan mat-
ters. Congress changed this conclusion when it adopted ERISA in
1974. Plan administrator's of interstate plans need to administer em-
ployee benefit plans without reference to varying state laws. So Con-
gress preempted state law insofar as it relates to employee benefit
plans. The Supreme Court has specifically stated that this need for
uniformity extends to the ERISA causes of action and awards under
them.
ERISA contains a uniform federal statute of limitations for fiduci-
ary duty breaches. Due to a misunderstanding of the Supreme Court's
early pronouncements in 1985 concerning fiduciary duty breaches, the
circuit courts concluded that the ERISA statute of limitations did not
apply to any lawsuit except one for plan recovery of damages. Conse-
quently, the circuit courts concluded ERISA contained no statute of
limitations for the informational penalty lawsuit, the benefits due
lawsuit, and the equitable remedy to enforce plan provisions, author-
izing the circuit courts to apply the most analogous state statute of
limitations to these ERISA lawsuits. The Supreme Court, however, in
1996 confirmed that other ERISA causes of action also seek remedies
for fiduciary duty breach. Consequently, the ERISA statute of limita-
tions applies to these three ERISA causes of action, not the most anal-
ogous state statute of limitation rule.
Due to another misunderstanding of the pre-1983 Supreme Court's
directives, the circuit courts have concluded that, for those ERISA
causes of action for which the ERISA statute of limitations does not
apply, the court is automatically authorized to apply the most analo-
gous state statute of limitations. Since 1983, the Supreme Court has
made it clear that the most analogous state statute of limitations rule
is authorized only if consistent with federal policy as delineated by
Congress. The Supreme Court has spelled out a three-step process to
determine whether to use a uniform federal statute of limitations and
avoid the most analogous state statute of limitations: (1) whether the
federal cause of action demands a uniform statute of limitations; (2) if
so, whether the uniform limitations period should come from federal
law; and (3) if so, whether the selected federal statute of limitations
constitutes a significantly closer fit to the federal cause of action. Ap-
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plying this three-step process to the ERISA causes of action results in
using the ERISA statute of limitations, not only for the informational
penalty lawsuit, the benefits due lawsuit, and the equitable remedy to
enforce plan provisions, but also for the employer retaliatory discrimi-
nation lawsuit and the delinquent employer contribution lawsuit.
For those sponsors of interstate employee benefit plans not desir-
ous of waiting for the circuit courts eventually to follow the law, the
alternative is to provide for a contractual limitations period in the
plan, the participant's employment contract, and in the collective bar-
gaining agreement that is not unreasonably short. The circuit courts
have upheld these contractual provisions in ERISA cases.
The time has come to end the fumbling of the limitations issue and
to conform ERISA litigation practices to Justice Byron "Whizzer"
White's directive and congressional desires. Congress has recognized
the wastefulness of the most analogous state statute of limitations
and eliminated it for federal causes of action enacted after 1991. Con-
gress did not include ERISA causes of action, enacted before 1991, in
the favored group under the mistaken belief that the law was well-
settled for these older statutes. The recent ERISA litigation, however,
belies that belief. Following the law as laid out by the Supreme Court
will eliminate the problem.
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